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INVESTORS BEWARE: ASSESSING SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN INDIA AND CHINA
ANN M. SCARLETT*
ABSTRACT
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States
government bailed out many business entities in exchange for
equity and debt interests in such entities. It also dramatically
increased the regulations imposed on businesses. This level of
government ownership and intervention in corporations is rare in
free market capitalist systems such as the United States.
Government ownership and control, however, are common among
historically socialist countries such as India or communist
countries such as China.      
stand in stark contrast to the trend in India and China, which have
both been moving toward more capitalist systems by disentangling
government from business enterprises, reducing regulations and
government interventions, and allowing free markets to develop.
One specific example of such change in India and China is their
recent acceptance of the shareholder derivative device, which
empowers private investors to bring claims on behalf of a
corporation when it has been harmed by outside parties or, more
typically, by its own management. The shareholder derivative
device is widely recognized among developed countries. This
Article compares the nature of corporations and shareholder
derivative litigation in the United States, India, and China. It
specifically examines why India and China have embraced the
shareholder derivative device and analyzes whether the device
provides real protection for investors in Indian and Chinese
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. This Article has
benefited from comments by participants at the Midwest Law and Economics
           
University of Colorado School of Law. It has also benefited immeasurably from
comments by participants in workshops at the Salmon P. Chase College of Law at
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research assistance.
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corporations. Finally, this Article considers the lessons that
investors, corporations, and the United States should draw from
 litigation.
1.

INTRODUCTION


2008 included interventions into private business entities. To
ameliorate the disruption to the financial markets, Congress
enacted sweeping legislation known as the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008,1 which included the well known
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).2 As its name suggests,
TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase
troubled assets from financial institutions caught in the turmoil of
the mortgage crisis and stock market collapse.3 As security for the
purchase of such troubled assets, TARP required that the Treasury
Department receive stock or debt interests in those institutions.4
TARP further entitled the Treasury Secretary to set corporate
governance standards for those financial institutions from which it
purchased troubled assets in exchange for equity or debt interests.5
The Treasury Department, however, never actually bought
troubled assets from financial institutions as directed by TARP.
Instead, it simply invested capital into financial institutions in
return for equity or debt interests.6 For example, the Treasury
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 520152 (2010).
Id. § 5211.
3 Id.
4 See id. § 5223 (requiring as a precondition to aiding troubled assets that the
Treasury Department receive warrants to purchase common or preferred stock,
or           
Department receive senior debt instruments).
5 See id. § 5221      e the financial
. Using that
power, the Treasury Secretary limited the executive compensation of participating
     See Tarp Capital Purchase
Program, 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.230.3 (2009). The Treasury Department also forbade
golden parachutes for senior executive officers in such institutions. Id. §§ 30.8
30.9.
6 See Testimony on the Troubled Assets Relief Program: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.
3 (2009) (outlining a statement by Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Assistant Secretary for
Financial Stability, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (discussing certain treasury
programs enacted after the 2008 financial crisis). See also Press Release, 
Treasury, HP 1338: Treasury Releases Guidelines for Targeted Investment
Program (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press center/press
1
2
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Department invested $45 billion in Citigroup Inc. in return for
warrants to purchase its common shares, which resulted in the
        7
The Treasury Department has also twice bailed out American
International Group Inc. (AIG), an insurance company, which
      current ownership
Perhaps more shockingly, the Treasury Department
stake.8
ordered each of the nine largest financial institutions in the United
States to accept $125 million, which most of them did not need or
want, and then refused to allow these institutions to repay those
funds until it said they were ready to do so.9
In addition, two domestic automakersGeneral Motors Co.
and Chrysler Group LLCand their affiliated financing entities
convinced the Secretary of the Treasury to extend $81 billion in
TARP funds to them and the Treasury Department again acquired
equity and debt interests in return.10 For example, the Treasury
Department invested $50 billion in General Motors as part of the
 bankruptcy reorganization, which resulted in the
government owning a 61% majority interest in 2009 and currently a
releases/Pages/hp1338.aspx (discussing the guidelines, justification, and
eligibility for the Targeted Investment Program).
7 See Tom Barkley, TARP Profit on Citigroup: $12.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748703293204576

de           
stock).
8 See Serena Ng & Erik Holm, AIG Swings to Profit but Problems Persist, WALL
ST.
J.,
Feb.
25,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703408604576164724143769978.html  proposed
           
    Serena Ng et al., AIG, U.S. Agree on an Exit Deal
Making It Work Will Be Tougher, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704483004575523261932975260.h
tml 
9 See William M. Isaac, Was TARP Worth It?, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2010,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billisaac/2010/10/01/was tarp worth it/ (listing
the nine financial institutions that were forced to accept the funds: Citigroup,
JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New
York/Mellon, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and State Street).
10 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: APRIL 20, 2010, at 11416
(describing TARP aid to the auto industry) see also Josh Mitchell & Sharon Terlep,
U.S. Unlikely to Recoup GM Bailout, Panel Says, WALL ST. J.
all, the government pumped about $81 billion into rescues of [General Motors and
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33% stake.11      
      a  
association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance
compan12
Although these bailouts have been extensively criticized on
many grounds, the resulting government ownership interests in
private corporations are perhaps the most troubling aspects for the
     When faced with a financial
crisis, officials in the United States government did not trust the
free market system to correct itself. Instead, the United States
government rushed in with public funds to rescue business entities
allegedly on the brink of disaster. In return, the government took
equity and debt interests in these business entities.
Such
government ownership of private corporations is rare in the
history of the United States.13 Many commentators argue that the
esses that
have the clout to lobby for such handouts and thus threaten the
competitiveness of other businesses, particularly small ones.14
Similarly, other critics contend that these government
interventions undermine the functioning of the free market system,
because businesses are not held responsible for their bad decisions
by free market forces.15 Criticism has also been leveled at the
11 See Mitchell & Terlep, U.S. Unlikely to Recoup GM Bailout, supra note 10

in General Motors).
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 5202(5), 5211 (2010).
13 See, e.g., New Panama Canal Company Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57 183, 32
Stat. 481 (1902) (detailing how the United States acquired the Panama Canal)
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. (1933) (establishing
the Tennessee Valley Authority).
14 See Keith Naughton & Alison Fitzgerald, Ford Objects to Unfair Advantage
June
8,
2009,
for
Bailed
Out
GMAC,
WASHINGTON EXAMINER,
http://washingtonexaminer.com/business/2009/06/ford objects unfair
advantage bailed out gmac (arguing Ford was placed at a huge competitive
disadvantage compared to General Motors and its financing arm GMAC because
the latter received government bailout money Bloomberg data showed Ford
 for every $1 billion it borrowed Cf. Pete
Du Pont, Too Much Energy in the Executive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576148684150871602.h
tml (noting Health and Human Services Department has granted 733 businesses

15 See Luca Di Leo & Bradley Davis, 
  , WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703775704576162541139862146.html (stating that the bailouts
insulate ins
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designed to prevent further harmful conduct by businesses and
Wall Street, because these regulations have made a negative impact
on     16 The more the
government intervenes in private corporations through ownership
interests or regulatory controls, the more fuel that is added to the
argument that the United States is edging away from capitalism.
These recent actions by the United States stand in stark contrast
to the trend among emerging economies, of which China and India
are among the largest.17 India and China are moving toward more
free market systems, such as that in the United States.18 India has
been liberalizing its prior socialist policies and adopting more
capitalist policies to foster private corporations and credit
markets.19 Similarly, China is shifting away from the state owned
enterprises that dominated after the Chinese Communist Party
came to power in the 1940s to privately held businesses.20
One specific example of the changes occurring in India and
China is their recent acceptance of the shareholder derivative
       TARP Inspector: Citi Remains
   , WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748704307404576080193310619166.html (quoting Special Inspector
General for TARP as stating that [u]nless and until institutions like Citigroup can
be left to suffer the full consequences of their own folly, the prospect of more
bailouts will potentially fuel more bad behsee also Matt Cover, Free Market
Economists Reject Bailout as Bad Policy that Could Prolong Slowdown, CNS NEWS,
Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/free market economists
reject bailout bad policy could prolong slowdown (criticizing the bailouts for
creating a system 
16 See Jared A. Favole, Business Group Frets Over Rules Review, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703960804576120503694195830.html (noting the Chamber of
Commerce views the Obama administration as enacting excessive regulations)
James Inhofe,    Killing Machine, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/quietest_jobs_killin
g_machine_xAlRo2nRYjtYKaWKAwe7fN (stating U.S. Senator  
opinion that excessive new regulations harm employment).
17 See World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external
/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/download.aspx (listing China, India, Russia,
         twelve largest
economies by gross domestic product using U.S. dollars in 2009, with China first
and India third among the emerging economies).
18 See, e.g., SUBHASH CHANDRA JAIN, EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 384 (2006).
19 See infra Section 3.
20 See infra Section 4.
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device. In 2005, China enacted a statutory provision permitting
shareholder derivative litigation for the first time.21 India has
proposed legislation that would also recognize shareholder
derivative actions.22 Shareholder derivative litigation has long
been recognized within the United States and most other
developed countries,23 although the most frequent uses of such
litigation are in the United States.24 Shareholder derivative
litigation, however, is much maligned in the United States. Many
scholars advocate for the abolition of shareholder derivative
litigation in the United States,25 while others propose strict
limitations on such litigation.26 Shareholder derivative litigation
has even been criticized by courts27 and some state legislatures
have sought to curtail it through bond and pleading
requirements.28 In addition, some corporations may even attempt
See infra Section 4.2.2.
See infra Section 3.2.
23 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 146263 (2006) (assessing the legal risks
outside directs can expect to face in different countries, including the United
States).
24 See Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2002) (claiming that directors of non U.S. companies are
.
25 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 8.5,
at 404 (2002) (arguing that derivative litigation should be eliminated, or at least
discouraged) Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the
Derivative Suit and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 36768 (1994)
(discussing that it may be unnecessary to abolish the derivative suit if aspects of
procedural law that create incentives for litigation abuse are reformed) Alan J.
Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1629, 1682 (2002) (noting some principal agent theorists have
suggested that derivative suits be abolished).
26 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:
A Response to the Anti Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5354 (1990) (arguing that
corporate rules should be determined by private contract and not by courts).
27 See 
shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of
corporate boards . . . . Consequently, we have historically been reluctant to permit
shareholder derivative lawsuits, noting that the power of courts to direct the
         
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (

by shareholders).
28 See WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIV. 2d § 1835
(2006) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states requiring shareholder derivative
           
21
22
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to escape shareholder derivative litigation by requiring that
Despite the criticism,
shareholder disputes be arbitrated.29
shareholder derivative litig
effective weapons against corporate mismanagement. Indeed, a
wave of shareholder derivative actions quickly followed the
mortgage crisis and financial meltdown in 2008.30
Recent events highlight that the United States may consciously
or unconsciously be edging away from its free market system,
while the clear trend in recent years in India and China moves
toward free market systems. This Article explores this seemingly
inverse trend through an examination of the shareholder
derivative device.      
shareholder derivative litigation demonstrates one way in which
these emerging economies are seeking to attract domestic and
foreign investors, and perhaps shows a means by which they seek
to better compete for capital with developed economies, such as
the United States. Empowering shareholders to sue derivatively
on behalf of corporations reflects China   
efforts     in their corporate
governance and decrease government involvement in business
entities. It may also serve as a useful reference point for businesses
and governments within the United States as they consider the best
ways to compete in the ever expanding global economy.
Section 2 of this Article explains the nature of corporations and
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States. Drawing
comparisons to the United States, Section 3 describes the evolution
of the corporate structure in India and its recent recognition of the
shareholder derivative device. Section 4 then does the same for
expenses) DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (2008) (requiring shareholder derivative plaintiffs
to file an affidavit swearing that they will not accept any compensation for
serving as a representative).
29 See Andrew J. Sockol, Comment, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory
Arbitration of Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 1095, 1108 (2003) (proposing arbitration as an alternative to judicial
resolution of derivative suits) see also Scott R. Haiber, The Economics of Arbitrating
Shareholder Derivative Actions, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 85, 85 (1991) (noting securities
law disputes can be resolved through arbitration rather than litigation).
30 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2009 WL
4030869 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009) In re     
2009 WL 2610746 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) In re American International Group,
Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (providing examples of shareholder
derivative actions following the financial crisis of 2008 and holding that some
such claims are predicated on fraud).
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China. In Section 5, the Article analyzes the meaning and likely
effect of India      
litigation. It examines the reasons motivating India and China to
adopt the shareholder derivative device and the basis for the
specific forms chosen. In addition, given the existing legal systems
in China and India, the Article analyzes the likely effectiveness of
the shareholder derivative device either as a preventative measure
of ensuring good corporate governance or as a means to remedy
injuries suffered by corporations. It will argue that, while India
and China have adopted a shareholder derivative device that is
similar to the United States in theory, investors in Indian and
Chinese companies should be warned that the device will not
provide similar safeguards in practice. The Conclusion considers
the lessons that investors, corporations, and the United States
should draw from India  s adoption of shareholder
derivative devices.
2.

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Unlike corporations in both India and China, which are created
under the authority of the central government, corporations in the
United States are creatures of state law and are incorporated under
the laws of a state, not the federal government.31 Each of the fifty
states have enacted statutes that govern the powers and operation
of the corporations incorporated under its laws.32 The states,
however, are not equals in corporate law. Delaware, the second
smallest state in the United States, is the well recognized leader in
corporate law33 and is the leader in the state competition for

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 1.2, at 5.
Id.
33 See        Corporations and the Market for
Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 67881 (2008) (
corporate law by applying general market rules under which parties choose a
state of incorporation based on available laws) see also Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy
and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273,
1287 n.46 (2009) ( significant proportion of corporate regulation is handled at
the state level, with tiny Delaware being the dominant state in setting corporate
) see also Omari Scott Simmons, 
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 117175 (2008)
(describing Delaware as a leader in corporate law as a result of its experienced
judiciary, its business friendly reputation, and its substantial market share).
31
32
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corporate charters.34 A majority of states, however, have enacted
corporation statutes based on the Model Business Corporations Act
(MBCA),35 which was drafted by a committee of the American Bar
Association in 1950 and substantially revised in 1984.36
        e
laws, many of those laws are substantively similar.37 One key
distinction between Delaware and states adopting some version of
the MBCA is that Delaware created most of its law on shareholder
derivative litigation through common law development by its
courts, while the MBCA is a statutory enactment. Courts,
        
requirements much as the Delaware courts must apply their prior
precedents. 
laws differ        
courts are commonly followed by other states on corporate law
matters.38      
because of the large number of corporate opinions they produce,
particularly the Delaware Chancery Court whose judges are
recognized as having business expertise. Thus, courts in other

34 See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 106164 (2000) (arguing that Delaw
success in attracting corporate charters can be explained by the structure and
operation of its courts) Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious
Discrimination: FirmBased Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L

35 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., at v, ix. (4th ed. 2008) see also Jones, supra
note 33, a
law and settling disputes on significant corporate matters, the [MBCA] also has a
significant influence on the development of corporate law standards throughout

36 See Mulder, Introduction to ABA ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at iii (1959).
The text of the Revised Model Act appears in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (4th ed.
2008).
37 See Fisch, supra 
minimal
38 See, e.g., Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir.
1983) ], we discuss Delaware case
              
law. The courts of other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in
fashioning rules of c . See generally William H. Rehnquist, The
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State Federal Joint Venture of
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992) (celebrating the significance of the
bution to the U.S. judicial system).
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39
2.1. Corporate Legal Structure in the United States
United States corporations have a single board of directors
elected by shareholders.40
The directors of United States
corporations usually include a combination of executive officers
(inside directors) and independent directors (outside directors).41
Independent directors currently comprise at least half the boards
for publicly traded corporations,42 although the ability of these
directors to effectively supervise management is doubted.43
State laws give the board of directors the authority to manage
the corporation.44 Shareholders elect the directors and thus, at least
in theory, they may hold those directors accountable for their

Jones, supra note 33, at 1287 n.46.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2009) (describing
regulations for meetings and votes of shareholders respectively) MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (providing that directors are elected at annual
.
41 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923 (1999) (defining
independent directors as outside directors without affiliations to the corporation).
42 Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008
Financial Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010) Bhagat & Black, supra note 41, at
     public corporations] have a majority of outside
         DAVID SKEEL,
ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND
WHERE THEY CAME FROM     s already have a
       NASDAQ, INC., STOCK
MARKET RULES § 5605(b)(1) (2009) (requiring that a majority of the board be
comprised of independent directors) NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §
303A.01 (2009) (same).
43 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra 
disinterested . . . yet the directors simply nodded their heads as [the CEO and
CFO] spun their web of ma
supra note 41, at 922 (ndependent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather
than watchdogs. Sharpe, supra 
where a majority of directors are outsiders however, these boards often are
composed of individuals who are not qualified to assess the strategic viability of

44 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(A) (2009ffairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation,
and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the

39
40
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decisions by electing new directors to the board.45 Other than
electing directors, shareholders possess little power they cannot
initiate corporate action and vote only on dissolution, sales,
mergers, and amendments to the articles of incorporation and
corporate bylaws.46 If shareholders believe directors and officers
are mismanaging the corporation, failing to exercise proper
oversight, or acting in their self interest, their only recourse, other
than selling their shares, may be to file a shareholder derivative
lawsuit.
2.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States
Courts in the United States have long recognized the
shareholder derivative lawsuit, having imported the concept from
England.47 Shareholders may file a shareholder derivative action
on behalf of the corporation for an injury to the corporation.48
Typical shareholder derivative lawsuits include claims for
monetary damages based on corporate mismanagement, excessive
executive compensation, or corporate rights arising out of contract
or tort law.49 A shareholder may file a direct shareholder lawsuit
45 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2009) (describing
regulations for meetings and votes of shareholders respectively) MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (providing that directors are elected at annual
rd is staggered).
46 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 10506 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Business
Judgment Rule] (explaining that shareholders have virtually no power to control
daily operations of a firm, to control long term policies, or to initiate corporate
action) see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 56972 (2003) (discussing the weak
control rights of shareholders with the view that they are so weak that they
).
47 See Nicholas Calcina Howson,     
, 108 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 47 (2009) (noting that the shareholder derivative action
was imported into U.S. state law from England).
48 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a)       
shareholders or members of a corporation or an unincorporated association bring
a derivative action to enforce a right that the corporation or association may
 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.40(1) (2008)
           
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.2, at 362 
shareholder on behalf of the corporation. The cause of action belongs to the
corporation as an entity and arises out of an injury done to the corporation as an
.
49 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.2, at 363.
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when the shareholder has suffered an injury directly affecting her
in her individual capacity, such as a claim of oppression by a
minority shareholder or claims regarding shareholder voting rights
or preemptive rights.50
Shareholder derivative litigation in the United States faces
many disincentives and hurdles. Only shareholders who meet
certain standing requirements may file derivative actions within
federal and state courts. To initiate or maintain a derivative action,
the plaintiff typically must have been a shareholder at the time of
the challenged transaction and the plaintiff must also be deemed to
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders.51 Several states require plaintiffs filing derivative
actions to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the

own less than a prescribed amount of stock, measured either by
shares or dollars.52 A bond requirement is obviously a tremendous
financial disincentive to filing derivative actions. Even in the
absence of any bond requirement, shareholders often have little
financial incentive to initiate such litigation, because any monetary
recovery from a successful derivative lawsuit belongs to the
corporation.53 The shareholder thus at most benefits only to the
extent that the monetary recovery increases the value of their
percentage shareholding in the corporation. No financial incentive

50 Id. § 8.2, at 36264 (contrasting direct shareholder suits from derivative
shareholder litigation).
51 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a)      
maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent
the interests of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing
         MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41(2) (2008)
(requiring that a shareholder was an owner at the time of action complained and
        . But cf. DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) & (b) (2009) (requiring that plaintiff was a shareholder during
the challenged transaction and requiring an affidavit disclaiming any form of
compensation from serving as the representative of shareholders).
52 WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIV. 2d § 1835 (2006)
(listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states adopting security or bond for expense
requirements) see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7 107 402(3) (2007) (allowing a court to
compel a shareholder who owns less than a prescribed amount of stock to post a
bond) N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 627 (same).
53 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at § 8.2, at 36263 (providing the example of
derivative shareholder litigation arising from a breach of contract in which the
corporation as a whole was hurt and therefore a remedy should benefit all
shareholders).
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may exist for shareholders contemplating a derivative action
seeking only injunctive relief.
In addition, shareholders who lose their derivative actions

so called American Rule that parties to litigation pay their own
.54 Yet, unlike in many European countries, a losing
shareholder         
 55 Even if the derivative lawsuit is ultimately
successful, the shareholder plaintiff must finance the litigation
until settlement or verdict occurs. This financial burden during
litigation, however, can be alleviated if the shareholder can find an
attorney willing to take the derivative lawsuit on a contingency
basis, which is permitted in the United States.56 When a derivative
lawsuit settles, which most do,57    
receive a sizeable fee from the fund created by the settlement upon
court approval.58 When the rare derivative lawsuit reaches a final
54 See, e.g.,        1, 247
(1975)          
redistributing litigation costs in a manner c John
C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 67 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Privatization]
 American Rule, each side bears its own legal fees (which
            
invested in the action if the action is unsuccessful and is not generally liable for
)
55 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1406 (2006) (discussing the United
Kingdom    as one of many deterrents to derivative litigation)
Franklin Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 488 (2007)
 which places a significant financial risk on
a complaining shareholder who also recovers nothing personally if the suit is
successful).
56 See Coffee, Privatization, supra note 54, at 6 
may charge contingent fees in the United States, but that such fees are not
authorized in the United Kingdom).
57 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 910 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee,
Unfaithful] (noting that a majority of shareholder derivative lawsuits are resolved
through settlement) Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding settlement in about 65% of
resolved shareholder derivative lawsuits in a sample study from the late 1960s
through 1987).
58 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.       
Amy M.
Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead Plaintiff in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L     
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attorney their fees from the monetary recovery.59
A significant procedural hurdle for shareholder derivative
litigation in the United States is the demand requirement.
       
litigation, because the board possesses the statutory authority to
manage the corporation and its assets, which would include a
cause of action.60 In federal court and most state courts, a
shareholder is allowed to file a derivative action only after making
demand on the board to rectify the challenged transaction.61 In
may stand to receive a large fee from a settlement, even a settlement that brings
       Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder
Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 23 (1999)
[hereinafter Loewenstein, Shareholder].
In recent years, however, the courts have . . . been willing to award
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff if the derivative litigation resulted in a
substantial or common benefit to the corporation, whether by judgment
or settlement. The courts have been quite willing, too willing perhaps, to
find a substantial benefit when the derivative action settles, the plaintiff
seeks attorneys' fees, and the defendant does not object.
Id.
59 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970)
(recognizing that successful       

without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the
see also Loewenstein, Shareholder, supra
note 58, at 2 
the derivative litigation resulted in a substantial or common benefit to the

60 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.01(b) (2009).
61 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3).

The complaint must be verified and must . . . state with particularity . . .
(A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the
action or not making the effort.
Id. See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for
the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action and (2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made
unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has
been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the
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response to the       
(1) choose to prosecute the litigation itself (2) resolve the matter
through internal means or (3) reject the demand.62 If the board
rejects the demand, which is the typical board response, the
shareholder must demonstrate to the court that the demand was
wrongfully rejected before being allowed to proceed with a
derivative action.63 In some states, the shareholder can forego
making demand and argue that demand is excused, which requires
a showing that demand would be futile.64
To establish that demand is futile or that demand was
wrongfully rejected by the board, the plaintiff must show that the
         
decision.65 As more fully explained below, this defense presumes
that directors acted consistent with their fiduciary duties of care,

corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90 day
period.
Id.
62 See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 13491350 n.55
(1993) 
pursue corrective actions or take charge of the litigation. If management
disagrees with the shareholder's contentions, the demand requirement gives the
corporation the chance to reject the 
63 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.5, at 395 see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the
,
42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005)  
).
64 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that demand is
futile and thus excused when officers and directors are under influences that
impede their discretion to act on behalf of the corporation). The MBCA, however,
states a universal demand requirement. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
65 See Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000).

s emphasis on the business judgment rule supports
excusing demand in the case of an evenly divided board . . . . And in a
situation where a plaintiff shows that the business judgment rule is
inapplicable to a board decision, Aronson    futility of
demand has been established by any obj
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 BAINBRIDGE, supra note
25, at 395. Although plaintiffs argue that they cannot allege such facts with
particularity before discovery, courts typically state that plaintiffs already possess
the tools for gathering sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d
1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (describing shareh
as the media and governmental agencies, and the right to inspect corporate
records) see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2009) (stating 
inspection right) MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (2008).
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loyalty, and good faith.66 To show the defense does not apply in
the demand context, the shareholder typically must show that a
majority of directors were financially interested in the challenged
decision or were not independent in making that decision.67 In
other words, a trial court will permit a shareholder derivative
lawsuit to proceed only when the board of directors is disabled by
some conflict of interest because in such circumstances the judge
may presume the directors will not sue themselves.
Even when a shareholder survives a motion to dismiss based
on the demand requirement, a special litigation committee (SLC)
composed of independent and disinterested directors may move to

continuing the litigation is not in the best interests of the
corporation.68 Most courts find that the business judgment rule
    69 and therefore grant the
motion to dismiss.70
66 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)   
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
 see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916
17 (Del. 2000) (same noting that the initial burden is on the shareholder to rebut
the presumption of the business judgment rule).
67 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 81415 (Del. 1984) (stating that the
court reviews the factual allegations to determine whether the issue involves an
     case the business judgment rule is
inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction) see also Beneville v.
York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that in the case of a board with
only two directors, business judgment rule protection is unavailable because the
interested director can block the action of the impartial director). For the MBCA
provisions for overcoming demand, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(c) (2008).
68 Douglas M. Branson,  the Business Judgment Rule,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 64748 (2002) (explaining the procedure for establishing a
          
         
power to deal with the pending action, hiring an independent law firm to conduct
an investigation, and preparing a report that may be filed with a motion for
summary judgment) see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 279 (1986) (noting a SLC may believe dismissal is
y raise the stock price).
69 In some states, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the business
          
inquiry is limited to the disinterestedness and independence of the committee
members and the adequacy of their investigation. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128,
132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) Cutshall v. Barker, 733 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003). Other states
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Assuming plaintiffs survive these initial motions to dismiss, the
directors can again assert the business judgment rule defense in a
motion for summary judgment or at trial.71 The business judgment
rule defense is a common law principle that has been recognized
by courts in the United States for almost 200 years.72 An often
stated rationale for the business judgment rule defense is to
provide the protection needed for directors to fulfill their
responsibility to manage the corporation without fear of
shareholders second guessing their decisions through derivative
lawsuits.73 Thus, the rule allows directors to take calculated
business risks74       


the burden of proof on the defendants. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 37879 (6th Cir. 1984) Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 225
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In Delaware, the defendant also bears the burden of
proving the independence and good faith of the SLC, but the court may apply its
own business judgment in deciding whether to dismiss. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 78789 (Del. 1981).
70 Fairfax, supra note 63        rity of cases
           
Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI
Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 135657 (1993)).
71 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch.
2005) (stating that the business judgment rule applies in the absence of fraud, bad
faith, self dealing, or acting in a way that cannot be attributed to a rational
business purpose by the directors).
72 See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
93, 93 (1979) (discussing the idea that the business judgment rule is often
misunderstood, despite its long use in corporate law).
73 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003)
(describing the balance between deference to bo    
         A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01
cmt. d (1994) Arsht, supra note 72, at 95 (stating the business judgment rule

every corporate transaction to be subject to judicial review at the request of a

74 See Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 46, at 110 (referencing
          
Principles of Corporate Governance that the rule protects directors from hindsight
reviews of decisions that would stifle innovation) Branson, supra note 68, at 637
(stating the business judgment rule is necessary to encourage directors to engage
 Boss of
rtant Judge Takes on Greedy Executives, Congress, and
the History of Corporate Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS 43, 46 (July/Aug. 2005) (stating that
 guess decisions made by informed, disinterested
boards, for fear of chilling commerce an
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mistakes of judgment or unpopular business decisi75 Other
justifications include that  suited than courts to
make business decisions.76
The Delaware Supreme Court articulates the business
judgment rule defense as a presumption that directors have acted
consistently with their fiduciary duties in making decisions for the
corporation.77 To rebut that presumption, plaintiffs must show a
breach of fiduciary duty78 or demonstrate fraud, illegality, or
waste.79 If the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption, the business
75 Arsht, supra note 72, at 96 see also Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra
note 46, at 113
among a number of plausible alternatives. Given the vagaries of business,
moreover, even carefully made choices among such alternatives may turn out

76 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) see also Branson,
supra         equipped to review business

as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic
   Fairfax, supra note 62, at 410 (stating that directors are
       ). This judicial deference
for business decisions is difficult to justify, since courts willingly review decisions
of physicians and engineers. See Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 46,

       FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (asking
why judges can decide whether engineers have properly designed jet engines but
           

77 See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del.
2006) (describing due care determinations). To invoke the business judgment rule
defense, the board must make a decision, which includes a decision to act or a
conscious decision not to act. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
78 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (citing Penn Mart
Realt
to inform themselves) see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 91617 (Del.
2000).

Procedurally, the initial burden is on the shareholder plaintiff to rebut
the presumption of the business judgment rule. To meet that burden, the
shareholder plaintiff must effectively provide evidence that the
defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision,
breached any one   triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or
due care.
Id.
79 See, e.g., 
(dealing with illegality and fraud) In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 7374 (Del. 2006) (dealing with allegations of waste) Lewis v.

           

04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/30/2011 9:26 PM

INDIA AND CHINA DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

191

judgment rule defense protects the directors from liability for their
decision.80 On the other hand, if the plaintiff can rebut the business
judgment rule defense, the directors must then prove that the
challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.81 The MBCA
also contains much of the business judgment rule defense within
its standards of liability for directors.82 Judges invoke the business
judgment rule defense to protect boards of directors from legal
liability in the vast majority of shareholder derivative actions.83
Establishing a breach of fiduciary duty thus becomes an
important element in most shareholder derivative actions. The
fiduciary duties of directors are typically stated as a triad: care,
loyalty, and good faith. Delaware courts state that the duty of care
          
     84 and that
directors are liable only if grossly negligent.85 The combined effect
    ) Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968) (considering the issue of fraud).
80 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 91617 (Del. 2000) (describing the
business judgment rule attaching to protect director defendants if the plaintiff
shareholder fails to rebut the presumption provided by the rule) Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (same).
81 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 9091 (Del. 2001)  
presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted, however, the burden shifts
to the director defendants to prove to the trier of fact that the challenged
 see also In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (same).
82 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. (2008    oes not


83 See Fairfax, supra note 63s grant
to board decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most
see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND
HONESTY: AMERICAS BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 183
historical stUnfaithful, supra note 57,
at 9 (noting that the rare shareholder derivative lawsuits in which judges reach
         by a ratio of
twenty to one).
84 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) see also
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 36970 (Del. 1993) (holding
directors violated their duty of care because they were 
of all material information reasonably available before approving merger
agreement).
85 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch.
2005) (ex         
 Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 WL 42607,

to or a delibera         
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of the focus on procedural due care and the gross negligence
standard is that Delaware courts rarely hold directors liable for
breaching their duty of care.86 Similarly, the MBCA states that

a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar
87         
not reasonably believe [the decision] to be in the best interests of

director reasonably believed appropriate   88

care can be effectively eliminated, because all the states have now
enacted statutes allowing corporations to limit or eliminate
 of care breaches89 as well as to purchase
insurance to indemnify against such liability.90
According to Delaware courts, the duty of loyalty requires that
directors make decisions independently based on the merits of the


261 (Del. Ch. 1929)).
86 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch.
 see also Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790      
from liability whenever they make even a modest attempt to follow the
 supra note 63, at 407
years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of legal
             
Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 369
Van Gorkom is famous, of course, because it marked one of the few times
             cf. Stuart R.
Cohn,            
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 n.12 (1983)
(noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty
other than self interested transactions).
87 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2008).
88 Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii).
89 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009) (permitting the certificate
of incorporation to eliminate or limit a directo personal liability for monetary
damages for fiduciary duty breaches except for a breach of the duty of loyalty,
acts or omissions not in good faith acts involving intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law  for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit Fairfax, supra note 63, at 412 (describing

.
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
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transaction and that they be disinterested in its outcome.91
         
they will receive a personal financial benefit from [it] that is not
equally shared by the stockholders.92 Independence requires that
directors base their decisions      
subject    93 Delaware courts,
however, rarely find a director to be controlled by another94 and
never find non familial relationships to be bias producing.95
Similarly, the MBCA states the duty      
        
          
domination or control by, another person having a material
96

91 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) We have
generally defined a director as being independent only when the director's
decision is based entirely on the corporate merits of the transaction and is not
      see also Orman v.
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business judgment rule is

of the transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively whether the
transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its sharehol
92 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (Directorial interest also
exists where a corporate decision will have a materially detrimental impact on a
director, but not on the corp
93 Id. see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 26465 (Del. 2002)
(defining independence by focusing on whether the director has a familial
relationship with someone in the transaction or is controlled by another director
who is interested in the transaction).
94 Branson, supra 
reputable see also Beam v. Stewart,
845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004).


plaintiff must plead facts that would support the inference that because
of the nature of a relationship or additional circumstances other than the
 interested
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the
relationship with the interested director.
Id.
95            
personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are
insufficient to raise a rea     
Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 98081 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(finding allegation that a director was controlled by another director based on
their 15 year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt as to independence).
96 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iii) (2008).
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T
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the
    97 The Delaware Supreme Court has
defined the duty of good faith by identifying two categories of
 
         98
         
  99 The Court, however, has held that a
           

100 By contrast, the MBCA imposes
101
3.

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN INDIA

India has been greatly influenced by England. India was an
English colony from 1668 when the British East India Company
gained control of Bombay (now Mumbai)102 until 1947 when India
gained its independence from England.103 Thus, it is not surprising

as the U.S. legal system can be traced to England.104 In fact, some
105 While
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006).
99 Id. at 66 (describing this second category as proscribing fiduciary conduct
that does not involve disloyalty but yet is more culpable than gross negligence).
100 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 36970 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d
492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
101 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i) (2008) 
to the corporation or its shareholders . . . unless the party asserting liability in a
proceeding establishes that . . . the challenged conduct consisted or was the result

102 BARBARA A. FENELL, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPROACH
241 (2001).
103 Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian
Experience, 29 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 335, 348 (2009) (  
economic growth after difficult economic periods following independence in
1947).
104 Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India  Evolution and Challenges
9 (Indian Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649857      
common law system).
105 See John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India,
43 LAW & SOCY REV. 491, 499 (2009) (citing Indian Penal Code (1860) Indian
97
98
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an English colony, India had a capital market structure and

  106 India had four stock exchanges with
over 800 companies trading on them, including the Mumbai Stock
Exchange established in 1875.107 Not only did India have a large
capital market for an English colony, but it also had a  well
developed . . . banking system.108
After gaining independence from England, India turned
towards socialist ideas, and corporate governance radically
changed.109 Socialist planners had a set of core policies when they
     sufficiency by restricting
capital flow and imports, channel capital into large 
  te against large scale private sector
firms in favor of small scale firms, and foster development by
investing in education.110      
economy languished under what was referred to disparagingly as
 averaging 3% per annum until the early
111 This compares to a rate of 6% since liberalization began
in the mid 1980s.112
Since the mid 1980s, India has liberalized its economic policies
        
for global investment.113       
        


Contract Act (1872) Indian Evidence Act (1872) Criminal Procedure Code (1873)
Negotiable Instruments Act (1881) Indian Trusts Act (1882) General Clauses Act

.
106 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 351.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 352.
109 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 14
socialism during the decades following independence) see also Armour & Lele,
supra note 105, at 499500       
post independence government).
110 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 496.
111 Id. see also Afsharipour, supra 

to the slow growth rate often called the Hindu rate of growth.).
112 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 496.
113 Shardul S. Shroff et al., An Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Capital
Markets in India and Current Developments, 1720 PLI/CORP 51, 55 (2009).
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       114
Especially strong economic areas for India include pharmaceutical
and medical services, such as reading x rays for patients, as well as
computer services.115 India has experienced dramatic changes in
its economic structure during the past decade, and its stock
markets hit record highs in January 2008.116 In 20072008, 124
companies made public offerings in the markets totaling almost
$18 million in U.S. dollars.117
Additionally, foreign investment in India has grown
exponentially. the most attractive
        
Net foreign direct
growth     118
investment into India amounted to $22.9 billion in U.S. dollars in
2007.119        row, but
foreign investors have reported success in doing business with
India.          
with India report as much success, or even better success than
120

ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE EMERGING GIANT 107 (2008).
See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 3    
           
the pharmaceutical and computer services industries).
116 See id. at 35556 (discussing reforms in corporate governance in India) see
also Franklin Allen et al., Financing Firms in India, USC FBE Finance Seminar, at 10,
Apr.
13,
2007,
available
at
http://www.usc.edu/schools/business
/FBE/seminars/papers/F_4 13 07_ALLEN    

of market capitalization at the end of 2005 and its National Stock Exchange was
eighteenth).
117 Shroff et al., supra note 113, at 56.
114
115

Furthermore, 36 companies raised reserves worth [$5.231 million in U.S.
dollars] through the qualified institutional placement . . . [of] external
commercial borro       
 March 2008 amounted to
[$221.2 billion in U.S. dollars], reflecting an increase of 30.4% over the
previous year.
Id.
Id. at 8990.
Id.
120 Navneet S. Chugh, Doing Business in India 2009: Critical Legal Issues for U.S.
Companies, 1720 PLI/CORP 377, 381 (2009).
118
119
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3.1. Corporate Legal Structure in India
Prior       
derived from the 1850 Joint Stock Companies Act, which was
       121 After
independence, India continued to base its laws on the English
system. Even during I
its corporate laws, India followed suit by establishing a committee
to review its corporate laws.122 So, like English companies and
corporations in the United States, Indian corporations have a single
board appointed by the shareholders.123
3.1.1. 
       
controlled corporate governance through various statutes. The
1947 Capital Issues Control Act forced private companies to get
government permission to issue new equity, and then the
government controlled the price of such equities.124 A later statute
prevented private companies in India from merging or acquiring
other companies to realize economies of scale.125 The government
also took control of securities trading and listing requirements for
the stock exchanges through the 1956 Securities Contract
Regulation Act.126 The 1956 Companies Act gave the central
government (exercised through the Department of Companies
        
the judicial system power to regulate and oversee companies,127

Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 353.
See id.       
ultimately formed the basis for the Companies Act, 1956, was convened partly in
response to the report of the United Kingdoms Cohen Committee, which
recommended far        
(internal citations omitted)).
123 Klaus J. Hopt and Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe  Recent
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United
Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 ECFR 135, 150 (2004) (discussing the United
 tier board model).
124 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500, tbl.3 (discussing the 1947 Capital
Issues Control Act).
125 Id. (discussing the 1969 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act).
126 Id. (discussing the 1956 Securities Contract (Regulation) Act).
127 Id. (discussing the 1956 Companies Act).
121
122
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     128 The 1985 Sick
Industrial Companies Act created a state agency to take control of
firms with negative net assets.129 
regime and culture of licensing, protection and widespread red
tape that bred corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate
130
During this period, India lacked strong and developed stock
markets. Three development finance institutions (DFIs), state
financial corporations, became the main providers of long term
credit to companies. Through such lending, these entities acquired
large blocks of shares in the borrowing companies and their large
         
directors.131 Bank executives serving as board members, however,

management.132 At the same time, compan
businesses with little equity investment of their own so promoters

the DFI nominee directors mute spectators i  133
 slow bankruptcy process134
135 banks often refused to lend except to
128 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 14 (noting that the 1956 Companies Act and
other laws governed the functioning of joint stock companies and protected

129 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500, tbl.3 (discussing the 1985 Sick
Industrial Companies Act).
130 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 15.
131 See id. (commenting that the board of directors were nominated by
organizations with the highest quantity rather than highest quality of lending).
132 See id. (discussing the nominated directors routine of rubber stamp[ing
for the management).
133 Id. at 16.
134 See id. 
year timeline to reach a decision) see also Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500 01
     year winding up). When the board eroded the
          
reorganization system created by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act.
Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 16. The company would be referred to the Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Id. Once registered with BIFR,
Id. There
are some problems with the system, including: massive delays in the BIFR
reaching a decision, very few companies emerging successfully from BIFR, and a
legal process taking over ten years on average for companies that needed to be
liquidated. Id.
135 See Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500 (highlighting that creditors had
few options other than filing a suit to recover unpaid debts).
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blue chip companies and instead invested in government
securities.136 Because financial institutions limited their activities
and boards were largely ineffective in monitoring management
during the socialist era, minority shareholders were often subject to
fraud.137
3.1.2. 
After socialism failed, India began liberalizing its economy in
the mid 1980s.138 ralizing its economy

it threw off the shackles of Fabian socialism and embraced free
Following a currency crisis in 1991,140 he
139
government implemented a dramatic reconfiguration  
economy. The motivating idea was to move decisively away from
state control by granting a significant role to the private sector,
encouraging
competition,
developing
market oriented
    141 Some
goals of corporate governance included increasing investor
protection and foreign investment by repealing socialist era laws
and by creating new laws to attract investors.142 Foreign investors
          
socialist era.143
Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 16.
Id. at 17 (discussing instances of both unintentional and deliberate
irregular share transfers and registrations that have negatively impacted minority
shareholders).
138 See Afsharipour, supra 
made some tentative moves towards economic liberalization, although most of the

139 Amit Varma, , WALL ST. J. ASIA, June 16, 2005,
at A9.
140 See generally Valerie Cerra & Sweta Chama Saxena, What Caused the 1991
Currency Crisis in India?, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 395 (2002), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/cerra.pdf
(chronicling the devaluation of the rupee in the early 1990s and a subsequent
depletion of international reserves).
141 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 501.
142 Id. at 501 (stating that the Capital Issues Control Act and the Sick
Industrial Companies Act were repealed, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
was replaced with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, and the Securities
Contract Regulation Act and Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act were
amended to reduce government control of securities activities).
143 See id.         
opened to investment by foreign institutional investors, overseas corporate
136
137
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One of the most important developments was the
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
in 1992, because it replaced central government control of the stock
exchanges.144 The SEBI is similar to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission it is an independent regulatory
administration and can issue binding regulations on the stock
exchanges.145 The government also built up its securities markets
by establishing the National Stock Exchange in 1992, the National
Securities Clearing Corporation Limited in 1995, and the National
These new and
Securities Depository Limited in 1996.146
independent institutions provided the necessary infrastructure for
  growing stock markets and provided a sense of
security for foreign investors, who were newly permitted to invest
      147 Unfortunately,
      
because the SEBI and the Ministry of Company Affairs share
jurisdiction to regulate companies.148
While India has done much to revamp equity finance, it lacks
major reform in corporate debt leaving creditors without an
adequate remedy.149 To protect creditors, India established the
quasi legal Debt Recovery Tribunal and passed the 2002
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act and the 2004 Enforcement of Security Interest and
bodies, and nonresident Indians, who have been allowed to invest extensively in

144 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 18 (calling the establishment of the

in th
145 Armour & Lele, supra 
a regulatory framework to ensure transparency of trading practices, speedy
settlement procedures, enforcement of prudential norms, and full disclosure for
investor protection, rather than the prior emphasis on government intervention

146 See id. at 503 (discussing the establishment of the National Stock Exchange,
the National Securities Clearing Corporation, and the National Securities
Depository Limited).
147 See id. (highlighting the increase in the number of market participants
since the opening of Indian stock markets to foreign investors) see also id. at 492
(stating that the regulatory agencies, instead of the legislative or judicial branches,
were the most effective method of producing improved legal rules).
148 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 356.
149 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 505 (discussing the limited application
of debt enforcement laws to banks and financial institutions ordinary creditors
could still only recovery through civil courts).
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Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act.150 The effectiveness of
the new tribunal and these new laws, however, remains to be seen.
According to a 2007 World Bank report, the completion of a
corporate bankruptcy in India still averages ten yearsa tie with
Chad for the longest bankruptcy completion time in the world.151
3.1.3. Article 49
In the early 1990s, India experienced a series of financial
scandals, such as the Harshad Mehta stock market scam of 1992.152
These scandals occurred after brokers purchased stock at
extraordinarily low prices, subsequently inflated prices, and then
sold the stock at the higher prices causing the stock market to
crash.153 A similar scandal in 2001 again caused the stock market to
crash.154 The brokers were able to arrange these deals with
       
equities and the stock exchanges was relaxed in the post socialist
era, the laws were too lax to avoid such deals.155 In addition, a
        
than 4,000 companies raised 54,000 crore rupees (more than $1.2
billion in toda156
150 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 8 (discussing the measures taken to protect

151 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 505 n.16 see also Country Profile of India,
WORLD BANK http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES
/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:295589~pagePK:141159~piPK:1411
10~theSitePK:295584,00.html (last updated Jan. 14, 2011) (providing information

152 The scam allegedly defrauded an estimated 20 million people of $1.5
billion. Molly Moore, Panel Blasts Banks, Regulators in India Stock Scam, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 1993, at D3. Harshad Mehta reportedly gave the Indian Prime
Minister a suitcase full of cash so that he would overlook all the cash that banks
used to flood the Indian stock exchange. Id. Mehta, a government official, also
supposedly hindered the investigation. BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Parliamentary Report on Securities Scandal Presented, Dec. 22, 1993, at pt. 3 Asia.
153 See Tania Mazumdar, Where the Traditional and Modern Collide: Indian
Corporate Governance Law, 16 TUL. J. INTL & COMP. L. 243, 252 (2008) (describing
          
governance reform).
154 See id. (noting that the Bombay Stock Exchange crashed by 147 points in
2001 due to stock broker scandals).
155 See id. 
the fraudulent companies, merchants, and brokers).
156 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 252 (discussing how these companies failed
Rupee is the basic Indian monetary
CURRENCY
CONVERTER,
unit.
See
generally
THE
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Following these scandals, the Indian industry led the initial
efforts to instill public confidence in corporations and the securities
markets through changes in corporate governance.157 In 1998, the
Confederation of Indian Industry set up a voluntary code, called
the Desirable Corporate Governance Code, to protect small
investors, promote transparency, and take steps toward
international standards of disclosure.158 In the two years following
the creation of the Desirable Corporate Governance Code, twenty
five companies voluntarily adopted the code.159
While there were many proposals for changing corporate
governance, the SEBI developed a new provision that was based
      sirable Corporate
Governance Code.160 The SEBI adopted Article 49 of the Listing
Agreement and the provisions went into effect between March
2001 and March 2003.161 Although Article 49 only applies to
companies that have more than 3 crore rupees (about $660,000 in
U.S. dollars) in capital at the time it issued its shares,162 researchers
described         
163 Similar to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 enacted
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (providing the
conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 crore equals 10 million
rupees).
157 Id. at 251 see also Sarita Mohanty, Sarbanes Oxley: Can One Model Fit All?,
12 NEW. ENG. J. INTL & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2006) (noting that Indian corporate
governance calls for transparency and accountability in decision making).
158 CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUS., DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
CODE
(1998),
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents
/desirable_corporate_governance240902.pdf.
159 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 252.
160 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 36575 (discussing the proposed
government reforms and their associated implementation and enforcement
issues).
161 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 19 (stating the three dates in which the
Listing Agreements were applied to various types of companies).
162 See
Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate
Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India 2, 6 (U. Mich. L. &
Econ.,
Olin
Working
Paper
No.
08 005,
2011),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732 (emphasizing that Clause 49 was not intended
to apply to all listed firms in India). See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER,
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 crore equals 10
million rupees).
163 Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance
Reforms Increase Firms Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 749, 757 (2007).
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by the United States after a series of corporate scandals,164 Article

         
India, imposes severe monetary penalties and threats of delistment
for public companies that do not follow its mandates.165 Although
Article 49 was perhaps inspired by reform efforts in the United
States and England, there is substantial debate on the convergence
of the Anglo American model of corporate governance in India.166
l, economic, and social frameworks
have created a corporate governance environment that only
formally mirrors Anglo 167
3.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in India
During the socialist era, shareholders could potentially bring a
lawsuit for oppression or mismanagement under the 1956
Companies Act.168 The 1956 Companies Act, however, was unclear
regarding whether shareholders could file derivative actions on
behalf of the corporation and other shareholders.

Parliament is currently in the process of enacting a new Companies
Bill that would more clearly allow shareholder derivative actions
and also permit shareholder class actions.169 The new Companies
164 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 sought to improve the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
165 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 253.
166 See generally Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 34347 (discussing various
 on the convergence debate in India).
167 Id. at 341.
168 See id. at 355 (observing that the Companies Act focused on cases of
oppression and mismanagement, not investor protection). See generally The
Companies Act, 1956, INDIA CODE, § 397 (1956), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195601 (noting that oppression refers
to conducting the affairs of a company in a manner prejudicial to public interest or
interests of the company and its shareholders) id. § 398 (stating that
          
prejudicial to the interests of the company or the public interest).
169 See Soo Jeong Ahn et al., Asia / Pacific, 43 INTL LAW. 1007, 101314 (2009)
(listing the intended goals and provisions of the 2008 Companies Bill). See
generally Indian Companies Bill 2009 Likely to be Enacted by Year End, ASIA PULSE,

seek to give shareholders, particularly the minority shareholders a voice and
balance the interests between the minority and majority shareMohan R.
Lavi, Class Action Suits in the Bill, BUS. LINE (HINDU), Nov. 26, 2009, at 9
not much prevalent in India save for a meek shout at an
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Bill updates the 1956 Companies Act.170
It was originally
introduced in Parliament during 2008, and the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Finance successfully completed its
examination in August 2010.171 In 2011, the Ministry of Corporate

session.172
At 260 pages, the new Companies Bill covers many different
aspects of corporate governance, shareholder protection, and
government oversight of companies.173 While not yet in force, the
new Companies Bill will provide for significant changes in Indian
corporate governance.174 
the corporate sector in India to operate in a regulatory
environment of best international practice that fosters
   175 As stated by the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the 
in construction and provides flexibility to respond to the rapid
changes in the business environment while incorporating some of
the best practices in the field of corporate regulation.176 It imposes
Annual General Meeting (AGM)could gain traction with the Companies Bill
.
170 See Armour & Lele, supra        
          see also
The Companies Bill 2009, Bill No. 5 of 2009 (India), available at
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/Companies_Bill_2009_24Aug20
09.pdf [hereinafter India Companies Bill 2009].
171See Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Preparing for Indian
Corporates to Play Global, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOVT OF INDIA (Dec. 24, 2009, 17:18
IST), http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=56471 (explaining that the
new Companies Bill originally introduced in Parliament during 2008 lapsed for
parliamentary reasons, and then it was re introduced as Companies Bill 2009) see
also Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Promoting the Growth of the Indian
Corporate Sector Through Enlightened Regulations, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOVT OF
INDIA (Dec. 23, 2010, 16:40 IST), http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=68664
[hereinafter Promoting] (stating that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Finance successfully completed its examination in August 2010).
172 Promoting, supra note 171.
173 See generally India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170.
174 Timothy G. Massad,      
Implications for U.S. Investors and Corporations, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE,
DOING BUISNESS IN INDIA 2009, at 33, 42 (2009) (highlighting the Companies Bill,
2008 and other recent reforms and developments in India).
175 Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Companies Bill, 2008
Introduced in Lok Sabha: Bill Intends to Modernize Structure for Corporate Regulation in
the Country, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOVT OF INDIA (Oct. 23, 2008, 13:20 IST),
http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=44114.
176 Promoting, supra note 171.
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stricter corporate governance provisions, including disclosure and
accountability requirements as well as an independent director
requirement.177 In addition,     
new Companies Bill as providing protection of minority
shareholder rights and enabling groups of shareholders to take
legal action.178     
facilities e Governance in company processes, recognizes the
liability of Boards . . . [and] provides for a new scheme for
penalties and punishment for non compliance or violation of the
179
Under the new Companies Bill, shareholders may seek judicial
         
company have been or are being conducted in a manner prejudicial
to public interest or in a manner prejudicial or oppressive to him or
    180 They may also apply for
redress if:
the material change, not being a change brought about by,
or in the interests of, any creditors, including debenture
holders or any class of shareholders of the company, has
taken place in the management or control of the company,
whether by an alteration in the Board of Directors, or

it has no share capital, in its membership, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and that by reason of such change, it is
likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted in a
manner prejudicial to its interests or its members or any
class of members . . . .181

177 See Indian Companies Bill 2009 Likely to be Enacted by Year End, supra note
169 
stricter corporate governance norms is expected to be enacted by the end of this

178 See id. he new legislation . . . will also protect the rights of the
minority shareholders, [and] bring about responsible self regulation with

179 Press Release          Bill
Intends to Modernize Structure for Corporate Regulation in the Country (Oct. 23,
2008), available at http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=44114. See
generally KMPG, COMPANIES BILL 2008 available at http://www.in.kpmg.com
/TL_Files/Pictures/CompaniesBill_08_p.pdf (containing a summary of the most

180 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 212(1)(a).
181 Id. § 212(1)(b).
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These provisions for oppression and change in shares within the
        
direct shareholder litigation.
The new Companies Bill resembles shareholder derivative
actions in the United States to the extent that it permits lawsuits for
mismanagement. This resemblance is solidified by the new

including duties of care, loyalty, and good faith that are virtually
identical to the MBCA provisions adopted by a majority of states in
the United States:
(2) A director of a company shall act in good faith in order
to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its
members as a whole, and in the best interest of the
company.
(3) A director of a company shall exercise his duties with
due and reasonable care, skill and diligence.
(4) A director of a company shall not involve in a situation
in which he may have a direct or indirect interest that
conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interest of the
company.
(5) A director of a company shall not achieve or attempt to
achieve any undue gain or advantage either to himself or to
his relatives, partners, or associates.182
The new Companies Bill further provides that directors

shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to five
183 In addition, any
director who receives undue gains must pay those gains to the
company.184
Only certain shareholders in Indian corporations, however, will
have the ability to apply for a judicial remedy. When a company
has a share capital, at least one hundred members or one tenth of
the total number of its members, whichever is less, or members
Id. § 147.
Id.
§ 147(7).
See
generally
THE CURRENCY CONVERTER,
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 lakh rupee equals
100,000 rupees).
184 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 147.
182
183
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holding at least one tenth of the issued share capital may apply for
a judicial remedy.185 If a company does not have a share capital,
then the members must total at least one fifth of the total
membership to seek redress.186 The new Companies Bill then states
that the Tribunal can waive these ownership requirements upon an
application by the shareholders.187 These ownership requirements
and the ability of the Tribunal to waive such requirements
resemble the bond provisions required by several U.S. states.
Those states impose an ownership requirement as a means of
waiving a bond requirement, but the new Companies Bill does not

expenses. In addition, no court in the United States requires that
the plaintiff obtain consent to sue from the other shareholders,
whereas the new Companies Bill seems to require such consent
when it states that if one shareholder can make the required
ownership showing, it can get consent to sue on behalf of the other
shareholders.188
panies Bill appear
broader that those permitted in the United States. In addition to
interim orders,189 if the Tribunal thinks that the affairs have been
conducted in an unlawful manner and winding up the company
would hurt other members, it has a wide range of remedies:

          

restrict transfers of company shares and terminate or set aside
agreements between the company and a director if the Tribunal
finds it just and equitable.190 Further, the Tribunal has the power
to set aside any transfer, delivery of goods, payment, execution or
      ty within three months
before the application.191 Similar to powers granted to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Tribunal may remove
any director from office.192 The Tribunal, however, also has the
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. § 215(1)(a).
Id. § 215(1)(b).
Id. § 215(1).
Id. § 215(2).
Id. § 213(4).
Id. § 213(2)(a)(f).
Id. § 213(2)(g).
Id. § 213(2)(h).
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power to appoint new directors, to dictate how new managers are
to be elected, and to impose any other equitable remedy.193 Finally,
the Tribunal may impose costs.194 This could mean that a winning
shareholder may be able to recover their litigation costs, just as can
a winning shareholder in the United States. However, this
provision could also be read to impose costs upon the losing party,
which would be contrary to the American Rule. It also is unclear
        This
uncertainty may deter shareholders from filing derivative lawsuits.
The new Companies Bill also permits a member or creditor to
seek a class action remedy if they believe that management is being
conducted in a manner prejudicial to the company, members, or
195 The class may seek an order on the following:
restrain an ultra vires act restrain the company from committing
breach of its articles void a resolution altering the articles restrain
action on a resolution restrain the company from doing any act
contrary to its provisions or restrain the company from taking
action contrary to a passed resolution.196 Any such order is
binding and failure to comply is punishable with a fine for the
company between five lakh rupees and twenty five lakh rupees
($11,000 to $55,000 in U.S. dollars).197 Every officer involved may
be punished by up to three years in prison or a fine between
twenty five thousand rupees to one lakh rupees ($550 to $2,200 in
U.S. dollars), or both.198

Id. § 213(2)(i)(l).
Id. § 213(2)(k).
195 Id. § 216.
196 Id. § 216(1)(a)(f).
197 Id.
§ 216(23).
See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER,
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 lakh rupee equals
100,000 rupees).
198
India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 216(3). See generally THE
CURRENCY CONVERTER, http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February
25, 2011) (providing the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1
lakh rupee equals 100,000 rupees).
193
194
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CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN CHINA

In 1700, China had 23.1% of the world income.199 China
established the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1905, and it was the
largest stock exchange in Asia until 1941.200 After the Chinese
         
Republic        
became creating a centrally planned economy.201 By the end of the
1950s, the government had taken control of all businesses and
closed the stock exchanges.202 Thus, corporations as they are
known in the United States disappeared.
       203 In
December 1990, the PRC reestablished the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to raise capital for
Chinese companies.204 By 2008    were the
second largest in Asia after Japan.205 As of April 2009, there were
         
capitalization of RMB16.9 trillion (over $2.5 trillion in U.S.
199 JAIRAM RAMESH, MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND
INDIA 57 (2005).
200 See Chenxia Shi, Protecting Investors in China Through Multiple Regulatory
Mechanisms and Effective Enforcement, 24 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 451, 46668 (2007)
(providing a brief histo     see also Yuwa Wei, The
Development of the Securities Market and Regulations in China, 27 LOY. L.A. INTL &
COMP. L. REV.           
market in Asia: the Shanghai Stock Exch For a chronology of the Shanghai
      generally W.A. THOMAS, WESTERN
CAPITALISM IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (2001) see also
LI CHANGJIANG (李长江), ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG DE LISHI HE FAZHAN
(中国证券市场的历史与发展) [THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINAS SECURITY
MARKET] 3 (1998) ().
201 Wei, supra note 200, at 488.
202 See id. 
see also Cindy A.
Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 66 (2002)         
corporations gradually disappeared. This was due to importation of the highly
centralized economy model f
203 Wei, supra note 200, at 488 (citing ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN
CHINA 5 (2000)).
204 Xiao Huang, Shareholder Revolt: The Statutory Derivative Action in China
COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON. (CLPE Research Paper 49/2009, Vol. 05, No. 09),
2009, at 45, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516448.
205 Marlon A. Layton, Note, Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the
, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1948, 1963 (2008).
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dollars).206 One unusual aspect of Chinese capital markets is the
large number of small investors. Small investors, defined as
investors with less than RMB1 million (approximately $150,000 in
U.S. dollars) in cash or shares, account for 99% of the total number
of capital accounts.207 These shareholders tend to have relatively
short investing periods and trade frequently, resulting in an
average turnover rate that is seven times higher than rates in
mature markets.208 This high turnover rate has fueled a view that
       
investments.209
4.1. Corporate Legal Structure in China
To understand how the Chinese markets work, one must
understand the unusual corporate structures in China. China
currently has both state owned enterprises (SOEs) and private
companies. These corporate structures have evolved over time.
4.1.1. 
From 1950 to 1984, companies in China were organized as
traditional SOEs with the State wholly owning the SOEs and
exerting management control over them.210 The traditional model
206 Huang, supra note 204, at 5. RMB represents the China Yuan, renminbi or
  RMB GUIDE, http://www.rmbguide.com/ (last visited
February 20, 2011). For the conversion of RMB to U.S. dollars, see Renminbi
http://www.chinability.com
Currency
Converter,
CHINABILITY,
/renminbiconverter.htm (last visited February 25, 2011).
207 Huang, supra note 204, at 5 (citing the figures of Shenzhen Stock Exchange
between January, 2007 and March, 2007, in: Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli
Weiyuanhui (中国证券监督管理委员会) [CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMMN],
ZHONGGUO ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHAN BAOGAO (中国资本市场发展报告) [CHINA
CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENT REPORT], at 269 (2008)).
208 See id.
209 See Barry Livett, Securities Industry Faces Challenge, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 25,
see also Xin
Zhiming, Stock Market Causes Heated Debate, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 13, 2001
(h       
contributes to the casino like qualities of the stock market). But cf. Li Xiang & Jiao
Xiaoyang, Rise of New Generation of Investors, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 18, 2010 (arguing
that an expanding group of young investors is becoming more sophisticated and
focusing on higher yields, rather than viewing the stock market as a casino for
quick profits).
210 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 5     
governance could also be referred to as the State ownership model, or the State
owned and managed model . . . . Not only did the State have ownership of all the
property of the SOEs, but it also enjoyed managerial powe
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depressed private sector growth and deprived the country of
economic independence because it firmly bound the State, SOEs,
and employees to each other.211
From 1984 to 1993, the SOE form morphed from the traditional
model to the transitional model.212 The goal of the change was that
        
authority and full responsibility for their own profits and
213 In 1988, China enacted the SOEs Law, which resulted in
three important changes: (1) allowed SOEs to be run on a day to
day basis by the factory or company director (2) provided for local
and central government supervision of the enterprise and (3)
created democratic management, such as allowing trade unions.214
The 1988 SOEs Law decreased government intervention and
allowed enterprises to function semi autonomously, but the
transitional model ultimately failed to provide the desired level of
reforms.215
4.1.2. 
, called for a market
economy in China.216 
modern corporate system] in the majority of backbone large and
medium  217 To achieve that goal, China enacted the
1993 Company Law, which provided the foundation for SOEs to
transform into state owned corporations, closely held corporations,

Id. at 6, 8.
Id. 
the State 
213 Id. at 89 (quoting a Chinese Communist Party Decision).
214 Id. at 910.
215 Id. at 11.
211
212

First, it was very difficult to identify a reasonable minimum amount of
profit for the SOEs to pay to the State. Second, although most SOEs
enjoyed benefits when they were profitable, they were unable to pay the
fixed amounts required to the State when they sustained losses. Third,
there was a fair amount of exploitation of the assets of SOEs for personal
use. Finally, too little SOE profits were retained for development
purposes, leaving insufficient resources for future expansion.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12 (quoting 15th CPC Central Committee, Decision on SOEs Reform)
(internal footnote omitted).
216
217
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or publicly held corporations.218 The 1993 Company Law requires
corporations to have three governing bodies: (1) shareholders that
        ng (2) a board of
directors and (3) a board of supervisors.219 Although shareholders
act as a body at annual meetings of U.S. corporations, corporations
in the United States have only a single board of directors. This
two tier board system is somewhat similar to the German system
with a board of directors and a supervisory board, except unlike in
the Germany system there is no hierarchy between the boards and
both boards are appointed by shareholders.220 As with most U.S.
corporations, Chinese companies must also have a chief executive
officer and a chair of the board of directors.221
SOEs continue to exist in China and are governed by the 1988
SOEs Law and the 1993 Company Law. SOEs must now meet the
following requirements:  clearly establish ownership (2)
provide well defined rights and responsibilities (3) separate the
enterprise from the government and (4) employ principles of
222 SOEs may now have shareholders and
these shareholders receive rights that are similar to those possessed
by U.S. shareholders, including rights in proportion to the number
of shares they own, entitlement to dividends and to net assets if the
corporation is liquidated, and limited liability.223 While the goal of
modern SOEs is to promote separation between the government
and the enterprise, this has been difficult to fully achieve.224
       
experienced an unprecedented wave of corporatization and
privatis225 Approximately 80% of small and medium sized

Id. at 13 Wei, supra note 200, at 492.
Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 14.
220 See id. at 1516 (noting that in Germany the supervisory board oversees
the board of directors and that the members of the board of directors are
appointed by, and may be dismissed by, the supervisory board).
221 See id. at 14 (noting that these were two new statutory corporate
positions).
222 Id. at 22.
223 See id. at 2223 
.
224 See id. at 2328 (noting that some SOEs are not holding shareholder
meetings, some have not established boards of directors, and the government is
 in fifty ).
225 Wei, supra note 200, at 492.
218
219
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SOEs have become corporate entities.226 There are two types of
non state owned companies recognized by Chinese law: closely
held corporations and publicly held corporations, but these two
types have a variety of subcategories.227 There are different rules
on the corporate composition for these two main categories and
their corresponding subcategories.228 Both forms of corporations
are organized and controlled under the Company Law.229 While
China now has individual investors, two thirds of outstanding
shares of most public corporations are still non tradable, state
owned shares.230 In 2005, the government began non tradable
share reform, but the reforms have not been as effective as hoped,
because only 28% of shares were tradable as of August 2008.231
China has passed laws and reformed the SOEs to introduce
private corporations and to allow SOEs to have private control.
These reforms give the appearance that the current structure of
SOEs is being supplanted by a corporate ownership structure
similar to U.S. corporations. The government, however, continues
to play a key role in Chinese corporations and the securities
markets, so the transition is not yet complete.
4.1.3. Corporate Governance in China
       
corporate governance rules. One, China suffers from insider
control, which leads to mismanagement and asset stripping.232
Not only do mismanagement and asset stripping loot the
government due to its large corporate holdings, but they also
discourage private investment and results in a loss of capital.233
226 Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 14647 (2006).
227 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 16.
228 See id. at 1622 (describing some of the subcategories of each corporation
and briefly explaining the governing rules).
229 Clarke, supra note 226, at 146.
230 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 5 6 see also Hui Huang, The Statutory
Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 4
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 227, 233 (2007) (noting that traditionally more than 60% of all
outstanding shares in listed companies were non tradable, state owned shares).
231 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 6.
232 Clarke, supra note 226, at 147148.
233 See id. at 148.

If management commits waste and fraud at the expense of shareholders,
this is obviously of direct concern to the state because of its large stake in
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Second, many Chinese corporations have majority shareholders
that dominate minority shareholders.234 A 2002 self reporting
study by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and
the State Economic and Trade Commission showed that 40% of
companies completed related party transactions with their ten
largest shareholders.235
To remedy these concerns, various governmental entities have
created a number of confusing and potentially conflicting
guidelines and requirements. Some Chinese regional governments
have passed corporate governance policy statements and guidance
documents calling for a specified number of independent directors
on each board.236 Similarly, central government agencies such as
the Ministry of 
guidelines requiring independent directors on corporate boards.237
In 2001, the CSRC issued the Guidance Opinion on the
Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed
Companies, which called for independent directors for listed
companies.238 The CSRC has also issued guidelines on corporate
governance. 
        
listed companies to adopt provisions with the exact or similar
wording of the CSRC guidelines.239 In January 2002, the CSRC
      

the enterprises being looted. But it is also a government concern where
the state is not a significant shareholder because in addition to damaging
individual (and institutional) shareholders, mismanagement and asset
stripping will, by discouraging investment in corporations, raise the cost
of capital in the economy generally and hinder growth.
Id.
234 See id. (stating      
management).
235 Id.  party transaction is not, of course, necessarily a transaction
on unfair terms to the company, but given the lack of institutional safeguards that
might ensure fair terms, there are legitimate grounds 
236 See id. at 17880 (discussing various 
reform efforts).
237 Id. at 18081.
238 See id. at 12829 Guanyu
zai Shangshi Gongsi Jinali Duli Dongshi Zhidua de Zhidao Yijan [Guidance Opinion on
the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies] § 1(1), issued
Aug. 16, 2001).
239 Id. at 183.
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provisions appear weak.240
While it is unclear whether
implementing the Corporate Governance Principles is mandatory,
companies that do not conform to them must disclose to what
extent their practices do not conform and the CSRC could pressure
companies to change their practices.241
4.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China
As discussed above, when the Chinese Communist Party came
to power, the government took control of all businesses and they
became SOEs. The government owned and served as the ultimate
management for those enterprises. Shareholder litigation thus was
        
government.
4.2.1. Shareholder Litigation in China before 2005
China instituted various corporate governance reforms and a
shareholder protection system in its 1993 Company Law. The 1993
Company Law, however, only provided weak shareholder
remedies and did not directly address shareholder derivative
242 In the 1993 Company Law,
Article 111 was the only provision granting shareholders the right
to bring a legal action:
If a resolution adopted b   
committee or the board of directors violates the relevant
national statutes or administrative regulations, or infringes
rights and interests of shareholders, a shareholder is

240 See id. at 184. (noting that the provisions relating to independent directors
are weak because they do not require independent directors, providing instead
only that the company may establish independent directors in accordance with its
needs nor do the provisions        
di
241 Id. at 186, 18889. Among other things, the Principles require companies
to establish an independent director system, but the Principles do not provide
clear rules on how ma       
board. Id. at 18889.
242 Id. see also Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 6  Company Law 1993
barely played any role in preventing misconduct by the controlling shareholders
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oin such
illegal act or infringing act.243
Article 111 failed to explicitly allow shareholder derivate
lawsuits and judicial decisions on Article 111 created complex
procedures for shareholders to bring a lawsuit.244
Even if Article 111 allowed derivative lawsuits, the only
available remedy was an injunction, not compensation.245 In
addition, if a shareholder wished to sue, the defendants and the
harm (infringement on shareholder rights) provided by the 1993
Law   246 Despite these limitations,
shareholders and company representatives did attempt to bring
lawsuits under Article 111, but the lawsuits never reached a
judicial decision.247 For example, an investor sued the directors of
Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical Co., but the court dismissed the
lawsuit finding that the legal interests of the shareholders as a
whole should be represented in a shareholder derivative action,
and thus the investor needed consent from all shareholders before
suing.248
Before the 2005 Company Law, shareholders lacked a clear
provision to sue a company when its directors or officers
committed a scandal.249 Thus, directors and officers committed
many corporate scandals without any consequence e]xcept for a
public criticism by the CSRC.250 For example, during the 1996 to
243

(1993)).

Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (quoting the Company Law, Article 111

244 See Jiong Deng, Note, Building an Investor Friendly Shareholder Derivative
Lawsuit System in China, 46 HARV. INTL L.J. 347, 356 (2005) (explaining that Article
111 provides for direct actions, but it is not clear that it provides for shareholder
derivative actions) see also Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (stating that Article
              

245 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (noting that the only shareholder

246 Id.
247 See Deng, supra note 244, at 365, 372 (highlighting difficulties encountered
in the course of shareholder derivative litigation).
248 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 11.
249 See Guanghua Yu, Towards an Institutional Competition Model of Comparative
Corporate Governance Studies, 6 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 31, 4243 (2003) (describing
the difficulty individual shareholders encountered in attempting to sue
           
).
250 Id. at 42.
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1998 time period, the Shanghai Jiabao Industrial Group Co.
engaged in illegal speculative trading of shares in other
companies.251 The Company used more than 300 individual
accounts to circumvent a government ban on trading and
introduced RMB228 million (about $34 million in U.S. dollars) in
primary and secondary markets through its activities.252 After an
investigation, the CSRC imposed a minimal administrative fine on
the chairman (RMB50,000 or about $7,500 in U.S. dollars), seized
the  mall trading gains (RMB840,000 or just over
$125,000 in U.S. dollars), and publicly criticised the []
directors.253 In 2001, a controlling shareholder of the Sanjiu
Medical & Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd inappropriately used RMB2.5
billion of company funds (about $380 million in U.S. dollars),
254 The board of
directors did not approve the use of the funds by the controlling
shareholder.255 The CSRC publicly criticized the company, but no
other action was brought against the controlling shareholder
because of the lack of clear provisions on shareholder derivative
lawsuits at the time.256 The list of corporate scandals goes on.257
In 2003, however, the shareholder derivative action was
introduced to China through its courts. The  
Court issued its Opinion on Some Issues in Trials for Legal Actions
Related to Company Dispute (No. 1) in 2003, setting up the first rules
for derivative actions.258 Shortly afterwards, the Jiangsu High
  ssued its Opinion on Some Issues in Trials for Legal
Actions Applied with Company Law (Provisional Rules),  up
Id. at 43.
Id. For the conversion of RMB to U.S. dollars, see Real Time Renminbi
(Chinese yuan) Currency Converter, CHINABILITY, http://www.chinability.com
/renminbiconverter.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
253 Yu, supra note 249, at 43.
254 See id.         
sharehol        
faced).
255 See id.         
board had not approved the controlling sharehol    

256 See id. at 4243 
.
257 See id. at 4047 (exploring and listing multiple incidents of questionable
corporate activities in China).
258 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 12 (citing this as the opinion in which

251
252
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the rules for shareholder representative actions.259 In 2003, the
    published the first draft of
Regulations on Some Issues Concerning Trials for Company Dispute (No
1) and allowed for public comment.260 This laid the foundation
for the changes in shareholder protections within the 2005
Company Law.
4.2.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China after 2005
After experiencing corporate scandals and realizing the need
for stronger shareholder protection, China enacted the 2005
Company Law, which included a provision expressly allowing
shareholder derivative litigation. The CSRC adopted new policies
in the 2005 Company Law based on the theory that a correlation
exists between capital market development and shareholder
protection.261 In order to increase capital in the Chinese markets,
CSRC thus agreed to increase shareholder protections in the 2005
Company Law.262 Meilun Shi, former CSRC vice chairman, noted
the importance of strong shareholder protection in order for the
markets to function: 
         
markets.
They have a direct impact on the successful
implementation of reform and the Open Door Policy, as well as on
 263 In 2000, the then current CSRC chairperson
stated that investor protection was the top priority for the CSRC.264
Additionally, authorities were concerned about protecting
minority shareholders. Given the high percentage of state owned
shares, minority shareholders were relatively powerless before
Id.
Id. For a discussion of the Supreme     
2005, see id. at 12.
261 Id. at 5. For the 2005 Company Law, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Co. Law of the P Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, revised
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 152 (Isinolaw) (China) [hereinafter
Chinese 2005 Company Law].
262 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 56 (describing the focus on investor
.
263 Deng, supra note 244, at 349.
264 See id. at 349 n.13 (discussing a statement made by Zhou Xiaochuan, the
chairperson of CSRC ).
259
260
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2005.265 Unlike the United States, Canada, and England, China
lacked an effective remedy for oppressed minority shareholders,
and thus a shareholder derivative action could play a more
important role in China than in other countries.266 The lack of a
shareholder remedy contributed to the weak corporate
governance system in China, especially in protecting minority
shareholders.267
Chinese government officials and commentators also believed
that a shareholder derivative lawsuit would promote better
corporate governance in China.268 Given the role of derivative
lawsuits in the United States and their impact on corporate
      
China had to institute a shareholder derivative system.269
The statutory shareholder derivative device created by the 2005
Company Law is similar in some respects to the MBCA in the
United States as well as recent statutory enactments in England
and Canada.270 Article 150 of the 2005 Company Law states 
director, a supervisor, or any senior officer shall be liable for any
losses of the company if he/she violates any provisions of laws, or
administrative regulations, or the articles of [association] of the
company in performance of his/her  271 While
Article 150 does not state if minority shareholders can sue majority
shareholders, it appears that a controlling shareholder, who
violates the interests of the company and causes losses through this

265 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 56 (noting the large percentage of
state owned shares in comparison to the percentage of tradable shares, especially

266 See id. at 6        
.
267 Yu, supra note 249, at 56.
268 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 
       

269 Id. See generally Guanghua Yu, 
Owned Enterprises: Of Takeovers and Securities Fraud, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 340
(2004) (exploring the potential benefits of using Western laws on takeovers and
securities fraud to diminish the inefficiencies related to Chinese SOEs).
270 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 1     
derivative law as bei
271 Id. at 7.
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violation, can be subject to a shareholder derivative lawsuit under
Article 152.272
Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law contains procedural rules
that distinguish between companies limited by shares (public
companies) and closely held companies.273 In order to file a
derivative action, p    
alone or jointly, more than 1% 
180 consecutive days before filing an action.274 For a closely held
company, no minimum ownership interests or time constraints are
imposed, presumably because abusive shareholder derivative
actions are considered rare in such firms.275 As in the case of India,
this ownership requirement for public corporations is similar to
those of bond statutes adopted by some U.S. states, although India
does not impose a bond requirement. Even if shareholders meet
the ownership requirements, they face financial disincentives
because China, like the United States, follows the rule that each
party bears its 276
Similar to the demand requirement developed in U.S. law,
Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law specifically describes three
circumstances in which shareholders may commence a derivative
lawsuit. First, shareholders demand that a governing body of the
272 See id. (explaining that while Chinese law does not expressly provide for
derivative suits against a controlling shareholder, Article 152 of the 2005
Company Law may nevertheless allow it in certain circumstances).
273 See id. at 8 d by shares (CLS)

274 See id. (listing the specific standing requirements for all shareholders
wishing to sue under Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law).
275 See id. (suggesting that stringent standing requirements may not be
required for closely held limited liability companies because the more public the
company, the greater the need for legislation regarding corporate governance)
(citing Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 178485 (2004)).
276 In China, the losing party bears court determined filing and litigation fees.
Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 9 (citing Measures on
   Acceptance of Litigation Fees 1989, art. 19). Accord Donald C.
Clarke, The Private Attorney General in China: Potential and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U.
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 241, 253 (2009) (the general
rule is ) Virginia E. Harper Ho, From
Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation U   
Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 1 fee
shifting rule on attorney fees, although court costs are borne either by the losing
. Cf. Elizabeth Ann Hunt, Note, Made in China: Who Bears the Loss
and Why?, 27 PENN ST. INTL L. REV. 915, 920 (2009) (explaining that 
and low damage awards deter many Chinese citizens from filing claims ).
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company brings an action and that body refuses.277 Second, the
governing body fails to raise a lawsuit within 30 days 
Third, if urgent
receiving the  request.278
circumstances exist where the failure to implement a legal action
would cause   to the interests of the
company279 This formulation of the demand requirement clearly
resembles the MBCA provision adopted by many U.S. states.280
In April 2006, tof China issued the
Provisions of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the PRC
Company Law,  initial interpretation of the 2005
Company Law and addresses some of the procedural issues in
shareholder derivative actions.281 In addition to the 2005 Company
Law, the CSRC has issued numerous regulations to improve
corporate governance and increase shareholder rights.282 For
example, the 2002 Corporate Governance Code empowers
shareholders to take legal action when a board or shareholder
meeting violates shareholder rights or violates laws or
administrative regulations.283
See Chinese 2005 Company Law, supra note 261, art. 152 (stating the
specific requirements for bringing a derivative suit in China).
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
277

No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action and (2) 90 days have expired from the date delivery of the
demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that
the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable
injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the
90 day period.
Id.
281 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 12
Court announced that this guidance would be introduced in several installments
so forthcoming interpretations may explain additional procedures).
282 For a listing of these guidelines, see id. at 10.

Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 1997, General
Requir       ,
Guidelines for Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed
Companies 2001, The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies 2002, and the Regulations for the Protection of Individual
2004.
Id.
283 See id. at 1011 (citing Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002 [Code of Corp. Governance for
Listed Cos.] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Jan. 7, 2001,
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Nothing in the 2005 Company Law, however, addresses the
substantive fiduciary duties of directors.284 Thus it remains unclear
what duties directors owe to the company and when they have
violated those duties. One commentator observed that 
law and regulatory practice remains unclear on the issue of
standards of liability for independent directors, and indeed for
directors in 285 Shareholder derivative actions filed under
the 2005 Company Law, however, may flesh out such duties as a
means of further promoting corporate governance reform in
China.286
5. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION FOR INVESTORS IN INDIAN AND CHINESE
CORPORATIONS
As Sections 2 and 3 discussed, both India and China have taken
substantial steps toward establishing free market economies since
the mid 1980s. India has abandoned the Fabian socialism that it
had adopted following its independence from England in 1947.
Similarly, China has moved away from its centrally planned
economy that the Communist Chinese Party implemented after
gaining power in the 1940s. As part of the process of moving
toward free markets, both countries have decreased state control of
corporations by increasing private ownership within existing
corporate structures and by encouraging entrepreneurship. Both
countries have also replaced central government control of their
stock exchanges and developed market oriented mechanisms to
encourage capital formation. More recently, both countries have
moved to recognize shareholder derivative lawsuits. Section 5.1
addresses the rationales for this change and the basis for the
specific derivative device chosen by each country. Section 5.2 then
effective Jan. 7, 2001), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release
/200708/t20070810_69223.htm, art. 4 (China).
284 See Chao Xi, In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms
and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 CONN. J. INTL L. 1, 2223
(2007) (suggesting that the 2005 Company Law would be improved by detailing
the substance of the general duties of loyalty and due diligence that directors owe
to the company) (citing Chinese 2005 Company Law, supra note 261, art. 148).
285 Clarke, supra note 226, app. 1 at 224.
286 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (supporting the idea that although China
          

.
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discusses the potential problems that India will face in
implementing effective shareholder derivative litigation. Section
5.3 discusses the likely implementation problems for shareholder
derivative actions in China.
5.1. The Rationales for Recognizing Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
Within the evolving global economy, corporations must
compete to raise capital from investors. Many investors want to
invest in foreign corporations and entire investment companies are
devoted to investing in international markets and emerging
markets specifically.287 Indeed, in the ever increasing global
economy, investors in the developed world are now investing
significant amounts of capital into emerging economies.288 Foreign
institutional investor
from $25 billion in 1990 to $300 billion in 2005.289
Naturally
to invest in foreign and emerging markets. Both countries have
already taken many steps to attract foreign investors, including
modernization of their corporate legal structures and their stock
exchanges.
The motivating force for now accepting the
shareholder derivative device appears to be a desire to increase
protections for shareholders, especially minority shareholders, as a
means of attracting more foreign capital investments. In addition,
recognizing shareholder derivative lawsuits is a method for
      

287 See, e.g., INTL FIN. CORP., FUNDING OPERATIONS 3 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/treasury.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/RoadShowPresenta
tion Sept2009/$FILE/FUNDING+PRESENTATION+September 2009.pdf.
(showing a presentation of the International Finance Corporation that includes
details on its fu        
    see also ISI EMERGING MARKETS,
http://www.securities.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011) (providing data on
emerging international markets).
288 See generally P. Krishna Prasanna, Foreign Institutional Investors: Investment
Preference in India, 3 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE, 40, 41 (2008), available at
http://www.joaag.com/uploads/4_PrasannaFinal3_2_.pdf
(detailing
how
transnational capitalism has led to a significant flow of capital from developed
countries to emerging economies, like in India).
289 Todd Moss et al., nvestment? Frontier
Stock Markets, Firm Size and Asset Allocation of Global Emerging Market Funds 1 (Ctr.
for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 112, 2007), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/12773/.
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corporate entities and capital markets, thus increasing domestic
investments within their corporate structures.
As described in Section 3.2    
Affairs has described its proposed shareholder derivative device as
providing protection for minority shareholder rights. Empowering
investors to bring shareholder derivative actions potentially gives
minority shareholders the power to protect themselves. The
provision of  Companies Bill that enables shareholders
to take legal action, however, is not well defined. The provision
does not delineate the causes of action for which derivative actions
may be instituted beyond oppression, mismanagement, and
changes to share rights, as explained in Section 3.2. Further, the
new Companies Bill defines standards of conduct for directors by
stating the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith that are
similar to those defined in U.S. states adopting the MBCA.
However, it does not empower shareholders to file derivative
actions for a breach of those duties nor does it define how those
duties could be breached. Despite the similar definition of
        
closely resemble the shareholder derivative laws of either the
United States or England.290 The new Companies Bill thus appears
to adopt the shareholder derivative device, but without sufficient
definition to truly enable minority shareholders to protect
themselves. This is but one of many problems that India faces in
implementing shareholder derivative litigation Section 5.2 will
explain other practical problems of implementation.


described in Section 4.2.2. China had a unique concern for
minority shareholders, given the continuing high percentage of
state owned shares even within private corporations. It also
expressed a belief that empowering shareholders to file derivative
lawsuits on behalf of corporations would improve corporate
governance.
    
provisions resemble the MBCA adopted by many U.S. states, as
well as the recent statutory enactments in England and Canada.
Perhaps this is not surprising since so many lawyers and
bureaucrats in China are trained in the United States and
290 Compare India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, with Companies Act,
2006, c. 46, §§ 260264 (U.K.) (specifying circumstances under which a court will
authorize a derivative claim in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland).
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England.291 
similar to those that have been well tested in the United States,
putting shareholder derivative litigation in practice will prove
extremely dif
5.2. Problems Implementing Effective Shareholder Litigation in India
While India has adopted many new corporate governance
laws, such as Article 49, that seem to provide strong rights on
paper, India struggles with effective enforcement.   
country known for vigorous enforcement of legislation. Thus far,
the enforcement of [Article 49] has mirrored the lax enforcement
292 While Article 49 went
into effect in 2001, it took six years before the SEBI brought its first
enforcement action293 despite a record of noncompliance with its
provisions.294 The weak enforcement of Article 49 may be
explained by the lack of provisions requiring disclosures and
accountability to shareholders.295 Issues of ineffective enforcement
will likely persist for the    shareholder
derivative provisions.
Most  legal systems are rooted in one of four legal
systems: English common law, French civil law, German civil law
[or] Scandinavian civil law.296 Researchers utilize two indexes to
compare the laws in these countries: a shareholder rights index

291 See generally David J. Lynch,       ,
USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2003, (Money), at 1B, available at 2003 WLNR 6107628
(reporting on the increased numbers of Chinese students and professionals
           
   Reaping Rich Dividends, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 16, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 20348532 (comparing successful Chinese efforts to attract
the return of western 

292 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 388.
293 Id. at 390. While there is weak enforcement overall, the SEBI has brought
enforcement actions. See id. at 39091 (outlining enforcement proceedings
brought by the SEBI).
294 See Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 162, at 10 (reporting a lack of
Article 49 enforcement actions        

295 See generally Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 254 (concluding that lack of

        

296 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 89.
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that scores countries from zero (low) to six (high), and a rule of law
index that scores countries from zero (low) to ten (high).297 Of the
four systems, English common law countries generally have the
highest scores on the shareholder rights index, indicating that these
countries offer the best protection of shareholder rights.298 
shareholder rights system scores a five, which is equal to that of
other English origin countries including the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and South Africa,
and better than forty two other countries including France,
Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.299
India, however, scores very low on the rule of law index
compared to other countries.300 The Scandinavian origin countries
had an average score of 10, the German origin countries 8.68,
English origin countries 6.46, and French origin countries 6.05.301
In the rule of law index, advanced countries tend to have high
scores on the index, while developing countries usually have low
scores.302 India has a rule of law score of 4.17, and ranks 41 out of
49 countries studied.303 , it appears that Indian laws provide
        
       304
Enforcement of laws, however, plays a greater role in corporate
governance than simply creating the laws, especially in facilitating
security markets that are not riddled with insider trading scams.305
Like the U.S. legal system, Indian laws accord a significant
role for the judiciary.306     
297 See id. at 9 (describing the indexes used to compare the four primary legal
systems).
298 See id. 
systems in the shareholder rights index with an average score .
299 Id. see also Allen et al., supra note 116, at 12 (observing a strong degree of
investor protections in India but finding such protection less effective in practice
due to corruption and inefficiency).
300 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 9.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. (noting that of the forty nine countries studied, India received a score
higher than only Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Indonesia,
Peru, and the Philippines).
304 Id. at 910.
305 See id. at 1011 (arguing that effective enforcement of shareholder
protection laws is more essential than mere well designed shareholder protection
laws on the books, which are poorly enforced).
306 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 359.
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slow and backlogged. A 2001 study found that twenty million
        
almost 22,000 in the Supreme Court.307 The results of this backlog
are devastating for shareholders seeking a remedy. A 2004 World
Bank report noted that it is common to wait six years for a first
hearing and twenty years for a final judgment.308 When India
enacted the Companies (Second Amendment) Act in 2002, it
created the National Company Law Tribunal and the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal to enforce the Companies Act
and other related     
companies.309 While these courts were promising steps toward
better enforcement, a recent study shows that these courts
are rarely utilized.310
Indian businesses have also shown a lack of faith in the legal
system. In a 2005 survey, 50% of firms surveyed said they do not
have a regular legal advisor and of the half that does, less than
[fifty percent] . . . have legal advisor with a law degree or a
license to practice law.311 The majority of business leaders lacking
a legal advisor reasoned that they did not need one because they
trust their business partners.312     
takes a back seat while reputation, trust and informal personal
relationships are the driving factors in screening counter parties to
313
307 See Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions
for the Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 144849 (2007) (citing statistics from a 2001
).
308 WORLD BANK & INTL MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF
STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT:
INDIA 6 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_ind.pdf. The
        governance
framework, including basic rights of shareholders, disclosures, and transparency.
Id. at 214   pliance with Organization for Economic Co
Operation and Development corporate governance principals).
309 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 360361    
Company Law Tribunal inherited most of its powers from its predecessor the
Company Law Board and consolidated some additional powers previously
enforced by various government bodies) (citing the Companies (Second
Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 11, Acts of Parliament, 2003).
310 Id. at 361.
311 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 2324.
312 Id.      a reason, 63% of respondents who did not
have legal advisors claimed they did not need lawyers as they knew all their

313 Id.
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In post independence India, unlike most developed countries
and typical of emerging economies, company ownership is highly
concentrated in the hands of family business groups.314 A 2006
study found that almost 60% 
affiliated with family business groups, and an additional 11% were
owned, either in whole or in significant part, by the federal or state
governments.315 In other large companies, promoters played a key
and persuasive role in corporate finance because, after
liberalization, many promoters owned half or more than half of the
company.316 
Dominant
      317
shareholders in India, such as promoters, seriously threaten
effective corporate governance because directors become company
insiders.318
In addition, smaller companies rarely rely on the legal system
       rotection regime (e.g.
ownership concentration, dividend ratio, and valuation) more than
  319 These companies often do not seek formal
financing sources, but rather rely on alternative funding sources

314 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 36263 (explaining that family
  and a primary reason
for a lack of disclosure and governance requirements under the Companies Act).
315 See Rajesh Chakrabarti et al., Corporate Governance in India, 20 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 59, 59 (2008) (exploring governance challenges resulting from this
concentrated ownership).
316 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 36364 (observing a shift during the
1990s where promoters began to increase their stakes in companies under their
control) see also K.S. Chalapati Rao & Atulan Guha, Ownership Pattern of the Indian
Corporate Sector: Implications for Corporate Governance 1, 11 (Inst. for Stud. in Indus.
Dev.,
Working
Paper
No.
2006/09,
2006),
available
at
http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/wp0609.pdf (stating that promoters own nearly half of
total market capitalization).
317 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 1112.

It is believed that this is a result of the ineffectiveness of the legal system
in protecting property rights. Concentrated ownership and family
control are important in countries where legal protection of property
rights is relatively weak. Weak property rights are also behind the
prevalence of family owned businesses  organization forms that reduce
transaction costs and asymmetric information problems.
Id.
Mohanty, supra note 157, at 234.
Franklin Allen et al., The Financial Systems Capacity in China and India 4
(Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.icrier.org/pdf
/6dec07/Paper_%20Rajesh%20Chakrabarti_Session1.pdf.
318
319
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such as friends, family, business partners, and informal trade
creditors.320 Only 26% of funds are obtained from formal sources,
which reduce the need for companies and creditors to rely on legal
remedies.321
Another significant concern is corruption, which 
legal system in general, and the enforcement of corporate laws in
particular.322 For example, there is rampant tax evasion and a
significant shadow economy, which accounts for about 23% of
 323 While India may have weak enforcement of its
laws, it does punish under performing CEOs because,  
more likely to lose their jobs when corporate performance is
324
Until India more consistently implements its laws through
judicial enforcement, the shareholder litigation rights created in the
new Companies Bill will likely prove ineffective. l
system cannot more expeditiously render judgments, then
shareholders will simply choose not to seek a remedy through the
courts. 
corrupt, they will not seek judicial remedies. Although India is
seeking to implement shareholder litigation rights to increase
        
undermine that effort. Consequently, domestic and foreign
investment in Indian companies may not reach the levels India
seeks until judicial reform occurs.
5.3. Problems Implementing Effective Shareholder Litigation in China
One issue with passing sweeping national corporate
        
trespassed into the traditional territories of both the Company Law
and Securities Law. This is particularly true in the area of
325 Consequently, the division between the
supervisory powers of the CSRC and the authority of the stock
Id.
Id. at 5.
322 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 15 (discussing the rise of continued
widespread corruption in the Indian corporate sector since the 1950s).
323 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 8.
324 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 13.
325 Wei, supra note 200, 
not provide detailed provisions on corporate governance, the CSRC has
endeavored 
320
321
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exchanges is unclear, leading to confusion in regulation of
companies and securities markets.326 Uncertainty in the law leads
to confusion over corporate governance rules. For example, it is
unclear what duties directors owe to the company. 
and regulatory practice remains unclear on the issue of standards
of liability for independent directors, and indeed for directors in
327 In       
shareholder actions and civil remedies may lead to enforcement
328 Shareholder derivative lawsuits, however, may
serve as one way to promote corporate governance reform in
China if the law can be sufficiently clarified to allow effective
enforcement.329 While China is not a common law country judicial
decisions in shareholder derivative lawsuits ca
of permissible conduct, and that may . . . be generalized by the
       
330
5.3.1. A Struggling Legal System
No matter the period of rule in China, policy has been
emphasized over law. During the Maoist period, the government
believed that laws were too rigid and would hamper the
revolution.331 Policy ruled the country, and legislation only served
as a rubber stamp upon government policy.332 During the
Maoist period, the State directed judges to decide cases according
to policy goals rather than legal principles.333

326 See id. at 503 (describing that while China theoretically has a system of
both government supervision and self regulation, in practice government
supervision is paramount and stock exchange self regulation is marginal) see also
Shi, supra note 200, at 47779 (explaining the CSRC  gulatory
presence over Chinese stock exchanges     
).
327 Clarke, supra note 226, at 224 app. 1.
328 Shi, supra note 200, at 485.
329 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (indicating that a well instituted
shareholder litigation system would improve governance in China).
330 Id.
331 See Layton, supra note 205, at 1959 (noting Mao Zedong's view of the law
as rigid) (citing Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1,
29 (2006)).
332 Id.
333 Id.
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Modern China continues to have little judicial independence

334 Not only are courts financed
by the level of government that created them, but they are also
administratively and institutionally accountable335 to the
government.336 For example, the Chinese Communist Party
supervises judges performing government administrative
functions such as tax collection.337 In addition, many judges in the
provinces are not legally trained.338 This lack of independence as
well as reliance on policy over law engenders a biased judiciary
that often favors local defendants.339 The Chinese Communist
Party has announced that it will elevate the prominence of its laws,
but this elevation will only occur vis à vis policy.340 However,
most laws and regulations continue to be an embodiment of
Chinese Communist Party policy.341
Thus, whether the
shareholder derivative provisions of the 2005 Company Law will
improve corporate governance and truly permit shareholders to

Id. at 195758.
Id. at 1958 (quoting Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision, 55 CHINA J. 67, 71
(2006).
336 See id. [Courts] are subject to supervision from [China Communist Party]
organizations and procuratorates, have limited adjudicative authority, are
charged with other responsibilities such as tax collection, and primarily employ

337 Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL AFPPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164,
17475 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) ( stating that 
governments often enlist judges in the work of birth control, tax collecting, urban

338 Layton, supra note 205, at 1958.      
L.L.B. degrees is estimated at less than ten percent and applicants for judgeships
were not required to take national bar examination until 2002 Id. n.73 (citing
Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 29 (2006).
339 See id.        

340 Id. at 1959. In 1996, the president of China formally adopted a policy of
ruling China in accordance with the rule of law. Id. n.83
341 Id. at 1959         
Communist Party to day governance
of internal [Chinese Communist Party] rules instead of judicial sanctions to
punish party members for le      
discretion (internal citations omitted)).
334
335
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recover for mismanagement remains uncertain due to the doubtful
ability of Chinese courts to enforce the new law.342
Not only do Chinese courts struggle to remain independent,
they also struggle to enforce judgments in civil actions. p to
fifty percent of civil judgments [in China] go unenforced343
Judgments go unenforced because courts lack sufficient personnel
and judgeswho are selected and paid by local governments
often refuse to enforce actions against powerful local parties.344
Additionally, other government agencies have proven unwilling to
assist courts in enforcing civil judgments.345
     m hampers effective
implementation of shareholder derivative lawsuits, other
alternatives may be needed. Public enforcement measures might
be preferable to lawsuits since China] has traditionally placed
greater emphasis on [its public enforcement] laws to maintain
control and discipline.346 Similarly, China may consider utilizing
private enforcement mechanisms rather than relying solely upon
shareholder derivative lawsuits. Parties in China often use
mediation (a private dispute resolution mechanism) because it is
endorsed by the government and is less expensive than civil
lawsuits.347
In addition to judicial problems, shareholders will likely face
difficulty in finding adequate representation to file shareholder
derivative actions. China lacks a sufficient number of legally
trained professionals to act as lawyers and judges.348 Lawyers
represent clients in only about 10 to 25% of civil cases and only
about 4% of Chinese business entities retain regular legal

342 See Shi, supra note          
improved legislation will change practices, as law enforcement has been a long
 id. at 484
).
343 Layton, supra note 205, at 195859.
344 See id. at 1959 (explaining why many judgments are not enforced in
China).
345 See id. at 1959 (using the example of state owned banks refusing or
delaying requests to freeze accounts).
346 Id. at 1960.
347 Id.       mediation continue to

omitted).
348 Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 43, 64
(2000).
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advisors.349 Moreover, even if a shareholder obtained a lawyer, a
Chinese lawyer might hesitate to even file a shareholder derivative
action. 
bar associations and controls their professional licenses through a
   350 By denying re registration to an
attorney, the judicial authorities avoid the procedures required for
formal suspension or withdrawal. Therefore, because lawyers
licenses to practice law must be registered annually, lawyers may
avoid accepting cases that challenge the government in some way.
Such cases may include actions against SOEs or actions against
private Chinese corporations if the government is a significant
shareholder. Even filing cases can be difficult for lawyers, because
courts have much discretion in accepting cases and often apply
both political and legal criteria to determine whether to accept
cases.351 This may further dissuade attorneys from prosecuting
shareholder derivative actions as permitted by the 2005 Company
Law.
5.3.2. Unclear and Problematic Procedures
        
and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures,
directives, notices, decisions, explanations, and so forth, all
claiming to be normatively binding.352 It thus is not surprising
that commentators have been quick to criticize the procedures
outlined in Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law.353 One critic has
noted that the 2005 Company Law may face enforcement problems
       rocedures for taking such an
action, nor does it elaborate on the types of remedies available to
   354 In addition, Professor
Huang has argued that the 2005 Law poses standing issues since
only current shareholders are allowed to file lawsuits.355 Unlike
Id.
China: Rights Lawyers Face Disbarment Threats, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
(May 30, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/28/china rights lawyers
face disbarment threats.
351 Id.
352 Orts, supra note 348, at 68.
353 See Huang, supra note 230, at 24249 (providing detailed criticism of the
procedures in Article 152 and suggesting potential reforms).
354 Shi, supra note 200, at 495.
355 Huang, supra note 230, at 242 
in derivative lawsuits is both under inclusive and over inclusive).
349
350
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shareholder lawsuits in Australia and Canada, former shareholders
may not bring lawsuits.356 However, only current shareholders are
allowed to file shareholder derivative lawsuits in U.S. state and
federal courts.
The 2005 Company Law also does not specify a statute of
limitations. By applying the 1986 General Principles of the Civil
Law, however, the applicable statute of limitations is likely two
years from when the company knew or should have known that its
rights were infringed.357 Since it is   
        
of limitations, the current law may prove unfair to shareholders.358
Company officials with knowledge of the infringement may
simply allow the statute of limitations to lapse without taking
actions because they could be defendants in a derivative lawsuit.359
In addition, shareholder derivative litigation costs have also
dissuaded shareholders in China from filing lawsuits. Litigation
costs in Chin       
Article 19 of the
  the  360
       
Acceptance of Litigation Fees, written in 1989, requires the losing
party to pay filing fees and litigation costs, but each party still pays
   361 This measure could be applied to
shareholder derivative lawsuits, because the 2005 Company Law
           
paid and clearly does not provide financial incentives for
shareholders to bring shareholder derivative lawsuits.362 However,
the matter is uncertain.      
investments, a rational investor in a Chinese corporation may
prefer to simply sell his shares rather than litigate in the absence of
such financial incentives.363

356 See id. at 24243 (com     
lawsuits to those of Australia and Canada).
357 Huang, supra note 204, at 910.
358 See id. at 10 (noting that minority shareholders may be prejudiced because
.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 9 n.42.
361 Id. at 9.
362 Id. at 16.
363 Id. at 13 (noting that litigation costs will detract most rational shareholders
from bringing derivative lawsuits rather than simply selling their shares).
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The likelihood and effectiveness of shareholder derivative
lawsuits could increase if China amends the 2005 Company Law in
key ways. For instance, shareholders would be more willing to
bring derivative lawsuits if an indemnity provision safeguarded
losing shareholders against paying litigation costs and the
 where such lawsuit
good faith and in the best interest of the company.364 Other
commentators have offered suggestions for funding Chinese
derivative lawsuits based on financing mechanisms in other
countries.365 To facilitate shareholder derivative lawsuits, courts
could also provide      
documents rather than requiring them to wait for the documents
until during discovery or at trial.366 Shareholders in the United
States, for instance, typically possess a right to inspect the
 367 In addition, the 2005 Company Law lacks
any settlement provision. Typically, settlements are not subject to
court supervision in China, which increases the chances of
frivolous lawsuits.368 To prevent this yet permit meritorious
      
settlements.369
6.

CONCLUSION

Shareholder derivative litigation has been recognized for
hundreds of years within the United States. Most states have
adopted statutory provisions explicitly empowering shareholders
to file derivative actions on behalf of corporations and defining
   Despite much criticism, shareholder

Id. at 15.
See Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Actions Happen in China:
How Should Lawsuits be Funded?, 38 H.K. L.J. 523, 53037 (2008) (analogizing the
several Western approaches to funding shareholder derivative lawsuits as
providing potential guidance for funding derivative lawsuits in China).
366 See Huang, supra note 204, at 17     trial
           
derivative lawsuit system).
367 See id. at 17 n.74 (discussing the shareholder demand for inspection of
records provision under Delaware law).
368 See id. at 10 (noting that Chinese courts are not required to approve
     settlement[s] without a 

369 See id. 
approving settlements of derivative lawsuits.
364
365
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derivative actions are frequently litigated in the United States and
thus continue to play an important role in corporate governance.
Criticism of shareholder derivative litigation in the United States
has not deterred either India or China from recognizing
shareholder derivative litigation. China has adopted statutory
provisions that closely resemble the MBCA, which has been
enacted by a majority of U.S. states. India has proposed a statutory
provision that also recognizes derivative actions, although only its

United States law.
India and China are both focused on developing a free market
system of private investment in corporate entities. Both countries
have recognized derivative actions for the purpose of increasing
       
willingness to invest in their corporations. To some extent, both
countries may anticipate that statutory provisions for shareholder
derivative actions may improve corporate governance, either as a
preventative measure to deter bad conduct by managers or to
remedy injuries suffered by corporations from such conduct. Thus,
China and Ind pursuit of a free market system has motivated
them to empower shareholders to file derivative actions on behalf
of corporations.
Shareholder derivative litigation in India and China, however,
faces significant challenges that may suggest the likelihood and
effectiveness of such litigation is marginal in the near future. India
will need to clarify the causes of action on which shareholders may
file derivative actions and also clarify for the procedures for doing
so.       to provide more prompt
adjudications for shareholder derivative litigation to be useful in
holding directors accountable or improving future decision
making by directors. China also will need to improve its judicial
system. Both countries will need to develop explicit procedures to
guide shareholder derivative litigation and perhaps to encourage
shareholders to bring such lawsuits. Similarly, both countries also
must develop their definitions of fiduciary duties for shareholder
derivative litigation to       
conduct.
This comparative analysis offers insights for investors and
corporations in the United States, as well as for the states. First,
investors should recognize that the shareholder derivative devices
as expressed by India and China does not offer the same
protections as it does in the United States, particularly given their
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existing legal systems. Although the recognition of derivative
litigation by India and China is appealing for symbolic reasons, it
provides only false comfort because their current legal systems are
unable to resolve the internal corporate disputes presented by such
litigation. Until substantial judicial reform occurs, the simple
message is buyer beware.
Corporations that adopt arbitration provisions to eliminate
tigation may place
themselves at a competitive disadvantage. To the extent that
corporations feel shareholder derivative litigation is broken, then
corporations should work with investors to improve the current
system. As recent developments in India and China demonstrate,
such efforts will likely influence other countries, especially in light
of efforts to harmonize corporate governance standards within the
global economy.
Finally, this Article offers a broader message on the direction
that the United States should be moving within the global
economy. Two of the largest and fastest growing markets in the
world, India and China, have been decisively moving toward free
market systems and away from their prior socialist and communist
systems, respectively. Both countries have been disentangling
government from business enterprises, reducing regulations,
minimizing government interventions in the markets, and seeking
methods for bet The changes that
they have implemented toward free market systems have proven
tremendously successful. To the extent that the United States is
edging away from its free market system through recent bailouts
and extensive new regulations, it is moving in the wrong direction
and is out of step with the global economy. The United States
must carefully consider the likely consequences of intervening in
private corporations and the capital markets.   
ability to effectively compete for capital in the global economy
likely depends on its continued support of the free market
principles that are being so widely adopted by other countries.

